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The Pragmatic Passion of Stephen Breyer
Now in his twelfth year as a Supreme Court Justice, Stephen Breyer has
written an important book, Active Liberty,' which crystallizes a fundamental set
of beliefs about the American Constitution and his role as a Justice. Taking
Active Liberty as the entry point, this piece places Breyer's book in the wider
context of his judicial opinions and activities as a Justice - and, as such, seeks to
provide a preliminary sketch of Breyer's distinctive place in American law
today.
I. VOICE
Active Liberty emphasizes one theme that Breyer says runs through our
primal document and that should help guide how we determine its meaning in
a wide variety of cases: the idea of democratic participation. Breyer argues that
our Constitution embodies not only a commitment to "negative liberty"
(protecting citizens from government interference with their lives) but also a
commitment to "active liberty" -creating and fostering a form of democratic
government in which the people "share the government's authority" and
actively "participat[e] in the creation of public policy."2 Viewing the
Constitution in this way, Breyer argues, will lead to better constitutional
interpretations and a more "workable democratic government.
3
To understand Active Liberty - and the Justice who penned it - we must
first understand what it is not. It would be a mistake to see this book-as some
of its critics have-as offering a "theory" about the Constitution. Breyer
explicitly disclaims that he is setting forth a "theory."4 Although a longtime
1. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005).
2. Id. at 33.
3. Id. at 34.
4. Id. at 7, 110.
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professor at Harvard Law School before becoming a judge on the United States
Court of Appeals in 1980 (he was an administrative law scholar whose writings
focused on the practice of economic regulation), Breyer is not by temperament
a theorist- certainly not in the sense currently fashionable in the legal academic
world. And his judicial opinions since becoming a judge have not seemed to be
shaped by general theories.
Instead, his book is best seen as an activity of induction. Here Breyer is
open about what the book represents: At a certain point in his judicial career,
after deciding an enormous number of individual cases and writing a large
number of opinions that explain conclusions in terms of legal doctrine and
practical policy, he has looked for a "pattern" in his own work.' The theme of
democratic participation, then, is not only what he has found in his study of
the framing of our Constitution and in American history, but also a thematic
pattern that he sees in his own judicial decisions. This is something, one
senses, that he had not seen until recently as such a significant and unifying
thread in his own prior work. He is not providing a roadmap for deciding
future cases. Breyer describes his ideas as "themes," an "approach," an
"attitude," not a "theory," and emphasizes that they can "help" decide close
cases, rather than dictate results without regard to other interpretative tools.
6
Nor is this book a comprehensive statement of Breyer's views of the law or
a full portrait of Breyer the Justice. Certainly the book's substantive theme of
democratic participation, however strongly Breyer emphasizes it, is only one of
his substantive preoccupations as a constitutional judge-themes and values
that include, one must add, a certain distrust of populist democracy and a faith
in elite expertise. 7 The part of Active Liberty that may capture Breyer's behavior
as a judge more fully is the book's other main theme, which is methodological:
Judging is a pragmatic and purposeful activity in which interpretation and
decision must always be attentive to the purposes of legal provisions, the
multiplicity of factors involved in specific cases, and the practical consequences
of judicial decisions, and should not focus exclusively on textual exegesis and
uncovering original understandings.
5. Id. at 11O-11; Linda Greenhouse, Court Veteran Remembers a Scary Start, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 16,
2006, at A31 (quoting Breyer as saying that "'[w]riting the book, the doing of it, forced me
to work through and find the coherence"' in his opinions).
6. BREYER, supra note i, at 6, 7, 9, 1, 12, 18-19, 34, 50, 53, 56, 110-11.
7. Active Liberty is particularly interesting to read alongside a book that Breyer wrote as a U.S.
Court of Appeals judge shortly before his appointment to the Supreme Court, which
emphasizes the importance of administrative expertise as a way to resist populist pressures
to overregulate risk. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGULATION (1993); see also BREYER, supra note I, at 86, 102-03, 105 (recognizing some
tension between democracy and administrative decisionmaking).
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To understand the book and Justice Breyer more fully, the book is best read
alongside Breyer's judicial decisions. The true virtuoso in Stephen Breyer is
expressed through recurring decisions in specific cases, explained through
unusually compact, complex, transparent, practical, and balanced explanations
in hundreds of opinions. Breyer's decisions not only address a wider set of
substantive themes than the book, but his decisions also capture the
particularity of Breyer's approaches to concrete cases and specific legal issues.
His opinions never rest on unitary principles, including "active liberty," but
invariably draw on multiple sources of meaning. He is not a case-at-a-time
judge, but he is always engaged in the detailed particularity of specific cases,
and in many ways his distinctive excellence is that he sees that particularity so
clearly and can hold in place and attempt to balance the many factors that he
sees at stake at particular moments of decision. These are the qualities that lead
some to view him at times as too subjective or too cautious; for me and many
others, however, they are the qualities that make Breyer an exceptional
Justice-a consummate pragmatic judge. His book is an important work of
self-reflection, made especially valuable because it gives us a glimpse into the
general thinking of a judge who lives each day in the fray, with responsibilities
and preoccupations very different from a scholar's. But we should not privilege
this book over the day-to-day work of Stephen Breyer the Justice, any more
than we might privilege a poet's reflections on poetry over the poems
themselves.
The book is a manifesto of sorts, a sustained expression of his personal
approach to constitutional interpretation, and a respectful criticism of the
current Supreme Court for having "swung back too far" in the wrong direction
by "too often underemphasizing or overlooking the contemporary importance
of active liberty. ''8 Moreover, Breyer's most interesting and important
contributions as a Justice have largely been in separate opinions -expressions
of a distinctive individual voice, not the views of a Court majority.
Given this, we should recall how Breyer was perceived and described when
President Clinton nominated him to the Court in 1994. He was perceived,
correctly I think, as a consensus-builder. 9 He was described as a moderate-
liberal Democrat: As a top staff member of the U.S. Senate's Judiciary
Committee, he had worked very effectively across party lines to find common
8. Id. at 11.
9. Remarks Announcing the Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be a Supreme Court
Associate Justice and an Exchange With Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 909 (May 13, 1994) ("He
has proven that he can build an effective consensus and get people of diverse views to work
together for justice's sake."); Paul Gewirtz, Op-Ed., Who Is Stephen Breyer?, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 24, 1994, at Di (highlighting Breyer's "vaunted ability to build consensus.").
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ground (indeed, this explained why his nomination to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit was approved by the Republican-led Senate even
after President Carter had lost the election to Ronald Reagan'"). As a Court of
Appeals judge, he had found grounds for decision that typically produced
unanimous opinions on his court. At the time of his nomination to the Court,
some perceived him as too much of a "technocrat" -holding against him his
background in administrative law and regulatory policy, as if those fields were
inconsistent with compassion-and some perceived him as insufficiently
ardent about social causes.1 But the dominant view was that he was a
pragmatic moderately liberal judge, and a person who had a good chance of
helping a fractured Supreme Court find consensus and common ground in
decisions. 2
To a large extent, this prospect of consensus-building has proven illusory.
Justice Breyer's colleagues on the Supreme Court, it has turned out, are not
especially committed to finding consensus. They are strong individuals who
have views that they wish to express. Most significantly, this is an era of
conservative ascendancy. To the extent that there are blocs on the Court,
Breyer is part of a minority bloc. At times he crosses over (more on this below),
but on many of the most contested issues at the Court he is part of the
dissenting group of more liberal Justices. Yet Breyer, by temperament, is not
the dissenting type. He likes to solve problems, find areas of agreement, and
cooperate with others. During an interview at the Brookings Institution, he
recently suggested that in his third grade class students were graded based on
their ability to get along with others -"participating and cooperating" was
what he called it. 3 Breyer emphasized that these are good traits to develop
among citizens in a democracy; but "participating and cooperating" is also his
own style as a person, and undoubtedly his preferred style as a judge.' 4 He
found at least one colleague who substantially shared his temperament and also
io. John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 470, 492-93
(1997).
ii. See, e.g., Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer To Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo3d Cong. 369 (1994) (statement
of Sen. Howell Heflin, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (stating to Breyer that "the
word 'technocrat' has been frequently used in descriptions about you" and "that technical
approach has sometimes been criticized").
12. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 9.
13. Stephen Breyer, Remarks at the Brookings Institution 51 (Oct. 17, 2005), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/2oo5lo17Breyer.pdf.
14. In this respect, he also emphasized "the importance for everyone of getting on with people
you disagree with." Id. at 45. He also cites de Tocqueville as noting that the reason American
democracy works is because people here "learn how to work together." Id. at 51-52.
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his instinct for moderation - Sandra Day O'Connor - and their colleagueship
would itself be an interesting subject for future scholarly study. But because
their political starting points were frequently different, and because her more
centrist position on the Court allowed her a somewhat wider field for coalition
building, Breyer and O'Connor never emerged as a consistent partnership on
the Court.
Although Breyer has never flagged in his optimism that consensus is
possible in most cases,"5 he has not become a great consensus builder on the
Court. Instead, he has emerged as an individual voice, and often in dissent or
in concurring opinions.' 6 He has certainly adjusted to his role, but it cannot
have been how he expected it would turn out. His book, Active Liberty, reflects
a continuation of this development of an individual voice and perspective, and
provides an additional path for spreading the influence of his ideas.
II. IDEAS
Breyer's commitment to active liberty has two different implications for his
view of how constitutional cases should be decided. In different situations, it
can lead either to judicial deference to the democratic process, or to judicial
invalidation of legislation that limits democratic participation. We see various
aspects of this two-sidedness both in the examples that Breyer discusses in
Active Liberty and in his opinions as a Justice.
is. It is revealing that in his book, as well as in public appearances, Breyer repeatedly
underscores that the Justices reach broad agreement in most cases and also that in the
Court's conference room he has "never heard one member of the Court say anything
demeaning about any other member of the Court, not even as a joke." Breyer, supra note 13,
at 44; see also BREYER, supra note i, at 11o.
16. This is not to slight the many cases in which Breyer speaks for the Court in majority
opinions. Many are of large significance. See e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)
(concerning abortion rights); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (deportation of
aliens). Some reveal a remarkable snatching of partial victory from defeat. See, e.g., United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part). And in many more
ordinary cases, by Supreme Court standards, Breyer demonstrates an easy command of the
multiple tools of legal interpretation to reach sensible results and bring majorities along. See,
e.g., Small v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1752 (2005) (construing a firearm statute). Moreover,
we do not know the consensus-building role of Justices who silently join majority opinions,
even though they may have been instrumental in producing the majority. Interestingly,
according to the Harvard Law Review's statistics for the 2004 Term, Justice Breyer was tied
with Justice O'Connor as the Justice most frequently in the majority in cases in which the
Court was not unanimous, suggesting the possibility that he has been developing a larger
consensus-building role. See The Supreme Court 2004 Term - The Statistics, 119 HARv. L. REV.
415, 423 tbl.I(D) (2005).
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First, Breyer's theme that "courts should take greater account of the
Constitution's democratic nature" leads him to be a strong advocate and
practitioner of "judicial modesty"17- the courts' deference to the decisions of
other more democratic branches of our government, branches that tend to
involve fuller democratic participation by citizens. In a recent study of the
decisions of the Supreme Court between 1994 and 2005, Chad Golder and I
have shown that Breyer has voted to overturn provisions of congressional
statutes the least number of times of any of the Justices-a showing that
surprised those who had associated "judicial activism" with the Court's more
liberal wing, of which Breyer is usually a part. (Indeed, according to the study,
"conservative" Justices voted to overturn congressional provisions the most
frequently.)" 8
Second, in certain contexts, Breyer's theme leads him to justify a more
active role for courts in giving concrete life to the Constitution's "democratic
nature"-by striking down decisions of other branches of government that
limit democratic participation. The early pages of Active Liberty suggest that
Breyer is more interested in the second, more activist implication of his theme
than the first.' 9 But in fact most of his major examples in the "Applications"
section highlight his deference to the choices made by other institutions (for
example, deference to Congress on campaign finance legislation, deference to
Congress on Commerce Clause and related federalism questions, deference to
the University of Michigan Law School on affirmative action).2 There are
certainly many situations in which Breyer has voted to strike down the acts of
other institutions as unconstitutional -for example, the death penalty for
juveniles21 and mentally retarded persons,22 school voucher programs that
involve religious schools, 3  restrictions on abortion,' laws punishing
homosexual conduct,"5 some antiterrorism detention measures, 6 California's
17. BREYER, supra note i, at 5.
18. Paul Gewirtz & Chad Golder, Op-Ed., So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2oo5, at
A23.
19. See BREYER, supra note i, at S-6.
20. Id. at 49, 60-65, 79-84.
21. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2oos).
22. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
23. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 717-29 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (Breyer, J.).
as. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
26. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
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"three strikes" law,27 certain restrictions on political speechs and sexually
explicit speech, 9 and copyright protections lasting an extremely long period of
time." But his work as a judge, like his book, shows him to be a liberal who
gives genuine deference to other branches of government.
The single most important area of Breyer's work on the Court has been his
opinions on the First Amendment, in which he has developed a unique and
pathbreaking approach to issues of freedom of speech. Indeed, in my
judgment, Breyer's are the most important new ideas about the First
Amendment on the Supreme Court since Justices Brennan and Black. The
entire active liberty theme in the book seems to have developed out of insights
and approaches that Breyer first developed in concurring and dissenting
opinions in free speech cases during his first years on the Court. Justice
Breyer's core idea is that the First Amendment's role is not simply to protect
individuals from direct government restraints on speech. The First
Amendment's freedom of speech seeks not only to protect a negative liberty,
but also to promote active liberty by encouraging the exchange of ideas, public
participation, and open discussion. In other words, the purpose of protecting
the freedom of speech in the First Amendment is to promote a system of free
expression that provides speakers wide opportunities for public and private
expression, provides listeners diverse sources of information, fosters greater
democratic participation, and creates greater public confidence in the
democratic process.
This has various implications. For one thing, it leads Justice Breyer to argue
that in many First Amendment cases the particular restriction on speech is not
the only free speech interest involved. Rather, the restrictions on speech in the
challenged laws may actually enhance the speech of some, even though they
limit the speech of others. Constitutionally protected interests "lie on both
sides of the constitutional equation."3 In such cases, Breyer argues, it is
27. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 35-62 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77-83 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
28. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 66 5-86 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the
dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
29. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). But see Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 6S6, 676-91
(2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding the Child Online Protection Act constitutional).
30. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
31. BREYER, supra note 2, at 48; see also Barmicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 536 (2001) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (" [T] he question before us... implicates competing constitutional concerns.");
Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 400 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring)
("[C]onstitutionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation."); Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 226 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part) ("[T]here
are important First Amendment interests on the other side as well.").
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inappropriate to assess a restriction on speech using strict scrutiny. Rather, the
right question is whether the laws "impose restrictions on speech that are
disproportionate when measured against their speech-related benefits."32
Questions can be raised about whether this recalibrated balance is appropriate
and whether courts can be trusted to implement it-as I have discussed
elsewhere33 -but none of these undermine the importance of Breyer's insights
and his challenge to the Court's current approach to First Amendment issues.
In a variety of separate opinions, Justice Breyer has used his new approach
to the First Amendment to reach conclusions that differ from his colleagues.
Most importantly, at a time when campaign finance laws were still under the
heavy cloud created by Buckley v. Valeo, 4 Breyer wrote a concurrence in Shrink
v. Missouri that showed greater tolerance for laws limiting campaign
contributions and spending so as to "democratize the influence that money...
may bring to bear upon the electoral process," and "to "encourag[e] the public
participation and open discussion that the First Amendment itself
presupposes."3 Here, Breyer foreshadowed the Court's later decision-if not
the precise reasoning- in McConnell v. FEC,36 upholding the main provisions
of the "McCain-Feingold" federal campaign law of 2O0277
Active Liberty gives particular attention to the issue of campaign finance,
and also to Breyer's view that courts should distinguish political speech from
commercial speech and allow greater regulation of the latter. Breyer has used
his approach to resolve cases differently from the Court majority in a variety of
other contexts as well, which show more fully the far-reaching implications of
his distinctive ideas. For example, he would allow Congress greater leeway to
require opening cable TV to more diverse voices in order to promote the
democratic objective of "'assuring that the public has access to a multiplicity of
information sources,"' even though the speech interests of the cable owners are
somewhat restricted."s He has indicated a greater willingness to uphold
legislation that restricts the media in order to promote privacy, in part because
protecting privacy of communications itself encourages people to speak more
32. BREYER, supra note i, at 49.
33. Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 139, 193-98.
34. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. 528 U.S. at 401 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
37. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in
scattered sections of 2 and 47 U.S.C.).
38. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 18o, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part)
(quoting Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994)).
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freely and thus promotes a more vibrant system of free expression. 9 Justice
Breyer has also been more receptive than the Court majority to upholding
restrictions on speech when there is an important competing value that is not
itself a speech value. For example, he wrote a dissenting opinion stating that he
would uphold a restriction on the programming leeway of cable operators
when the value on the other side was protecting children from indecent
programming.40
A second area where Breyer has made major contributions as a Justice is
federalism. Limiting national powers in federalism cases was one of the
hallmarks of the Rehnquist Court, and Breyer has been a leading dissenter in
this area and he gives it distinctive attention in his book.41 In cases such as
United States v. Lopez, in which the Court has struck down congressional
enactments as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause powers, Breyer has
emphasized the importance of deferring to Congress because of its plausible
conclusions and comparative advantage in assessing social facts (the empirical
detail of his dissent shows him writing in the tradition of Justice Brandeis42),
and because "the public has participated in the legislative process at the
national level" (invoking the active liberty theme)." His book gives somewhat
greater attention to federalism decisions striking down congressional
legislation because it "commandeers" state officials44 or violates the Eleventh
39. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 71-73 (discussing Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)).
40. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 835-47 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). That said, there are also situations involving what he considers core political
speech when Breyer might impose stricter limitations on speech regulation than his
colleagues. See Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 665-86 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from
the dismissal of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
41. BREYER, supra note 1, at 56-65.
42. For Breyer's interesting and perhaps self-reflective discussion of Justice Brandeis, see
Stephen Breyer, Justice Brandeis as Legal Seer, Brandeis Lecture at the University of
Louisville School of Law (Feb. 16, 2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/sp-o2-16-o4.html.
43. 514 U.S. 549 (1995); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); BREYER, supra
note i, at 62. The majority in these cases accuses Justice Breyer of abdicating any judicial
role in putting limits on Congress' Commerce Clause powers and relying exclusively on the
political safeguards of federalism. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-68. Breyer's response is that
"two centuries of scientific, technological, commercial and environmental change..., taken
together, mean that virtually every kind of activity, no matter how local, genuinely can affect
commerce .... Since judges cannot change the world..., Congress, not the courts, must
remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal balance." Morrison,
529 U.S. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
44. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992).
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Amendment by imposing damage liabilities on states4 S-and here Breyer
sounds an interesting if not completely convincing variant on his active liberty
idea. He criticizes these decisions largely on the ground that they will decrease
active liberty at the local level, reduce the role of local governance, and produce
less flexible and more national forms of regulation. These decisions seem easier
to criticize on different grounds - both on originalist grounds and on the
ground that Breyer emphasizes in his dissents in the Commerce Clause cases:
that Congress is the preferred institution for deciding where the federal/state
balance lies in these instances. Moreover, Breyer's arguments here rest in part
upon predicted consequences of striking down the laws in question that
subsequent experience may not have borne out. But Breyer's arguments in his
dissents and book are original and important, and also have the advantage of
moving beyond the common national sovereignty critique of the Rehnquist
Court's federalism decisions to suggest that the Court majority was
undermining its own professed commitment to localism.
Among the book's other applications of Breyer's active liberty theme, one
stands out because it is the only specific area of law that Breyer discusses that
he had not previously addressed in his judicial opinions, and it is a major one:
affirmative action. Justice Breyer joined Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in
Grutter v. Bollinger,46 the landmark opinion upholding the use of affirmative
action in the educational context. But until this book, Breyer had not
previously explained his own views on the subject. The Madison Lecture in
2001, in which Breyer first developed the democratic participation theme,
contains only the briefest mention of affirmative action in the specialized
context of race-conscious districting.47 Given that Grutter was decided after the
Madison Lecture, it is reasonable to think that the general ideas in the Madison
Lecture helped Breyer to see deeper links between his theme of democratic
participation and the affirmative action issue; that Grutter gave Breyer the
opportunity to think through and apply his new understandings in an actual
case; and that the section on affirmative action in Active Liberty allowed him to
present his ideas in his own voice. Thus, to a student of Breyer the Justice, the
book's discussion of affirmative action contains particularly interesting news -
45. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd. of Tr. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
46. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
47. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, The Fall 2001 James Madison Lecture at
New York University Law School (Oct. 22, 2OO1), available at
http://ww.supremecourtus.govpublicinfo/speeches/spl 1o-22-o1. html.
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and it is important news, because Justice O'Connor's departure from the Court
has made affirmative action one of the most important issues in play on the
new Court.
We do not know what role Justice Breyer played in helping to develop
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter,48 but the passages in the
opinion that Breyer emphasizes in Active Liberty certainly echo his own ideas
about democratic participation. For Breyer, the justification for affirmative
action in the context of higher education does not rest fundamentally on either
the idea that it is a remedy to overcome the effects of past or present
discrimination or the idea that, under our First Amendment, universities
should receive distinctive deference in making educational choices. Nor does he
emphasize the contributions that a diverse student body makes to education in
the university setting itself-the rationale in Justice Powell's famous Bakke
opinion,49 the central rationale offered by the University of Michigan itself in
Grutter, and a significant part of Justice O'Connor's opinion. Rather, in Active
Liberty Breyer justifies affirmative action as "necessary to maintain a well-
functioning participatory democracy.""0 He reads Justice O'Connor's opinion
as ultimately resting on this active liberty and democratic participation theme,
and quotes the following passage in which, he says, she drew her various other
arguments together:
"[N]owhere is the importance of... openness more acute than in the
context of higher education. Effective participation by members of all
racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential if the
dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.... [Indeed,] the
path to leadership [must] be visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our
heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and
48. We do know that they were the only two Justices who voted to uphold the affirmative action
program used by the University of Michigan's Law School in Grutter but also voted to strike
down the affirmative action program used by the University of Michigan's undergraduate
college challenged in the companion case of Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Because
their two votes determined the outcomes in these exceptionally important cases, it is
plausible to think that they discussed the cases. Breyer wrote only a brief separate opinion in
the cases, stating his votes and adding that even though he disagreed with the dissenters in
Gratz, he agreed with them that "government decisionmakers may properly distinguish
between policies of inclusion and exclusion." id. at 282 (Breyer, J., concurring).
49. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
5o. BREYER, supra note i, at 82.
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integrity of the educational institutions that provide this training ....
[And] all [must] participate ....
Although this is indeed a quotation from O'Connor's majority opinion,
Breyer's ellipses and brackets focus on Breyer's own interpretation-
culminating in the last sentence, which is largely a reconstruction and which
focuses attention on the theme of "participation."
Breyer then adds, in altogether his own words:
What are these arguments but an appeal to principles of solidarity, to
principles of fraternity, to principles of active liberty? They find some
form of affirmative action necessary to maintain a well-functioning
participatory democracy.... [If affirmative action were outlawed, too]
many individuals of all races would lack experience with a racially
diverse educational environment helpful for their later effective
participation in today's diverse civil society. Too many individuals of
minority race would find the doors of higher education closed; those
closed doors would shut them out of positions of leadership in the
armed forces, in business, and in government as well; and too many
would conclude that the nation and its governmental processes are
theirs, not ours. If these are the likely consequences - as many
knowledgeable groups told the Court they were -could our democratic
form of government then function as the Framers intended?5 2
Active Liberty discusses a variety of other areas of constitutional law-
ranging from privacy and religious freedom to criminal procedure and
desegregation -but there is at least one noteworthy omission. Unmentioned,
and perhaps understandably so, is the most momentous and controversial
constitutional case of Breyer's tenure at the Court: Bush v. Gore, 3 the case that;
effectively ended the Presidential election of 2000 and one that certainly
engages the book's theme of democratic participation.'
s. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 3o6, 332-33 (2003) (citations omitted)).
52. Id. at 82-83. Note his emphasis on "consequences" as a guide in giving meaning to the Equal
Protection Clause and his reliance on the amicus briefs to inform him about real-world
consequences.
53. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
s4. Breyer also does not mention two other cases with overtones of presidential politics in which
he wrote opinions: Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 710-24 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring), the
famous case in which President Clinton unsuccessfully sought to defer a sexual harassment
suit against him until his term of office ended, in which Breyer wrote an opinion formally
styled as "concurring in the judgment" but that was in many respects a dissent, and Rubin v.
United States ex rel. Independent Counsel, 525 U.S. 990 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the
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No sketch of Breyer can ignore the case, however. Breyer's dissent in Bush
v. Gore is a cri de coeur, as impassioned an opinion as Breyer has ever written,
addressing what he clearly saw as a calamity for the Supreme Court. Even
though written under extraordinary time pressures, it both dissects the
majority's legal arguments with analytic power and clarity, and also expresses
his vision of the Supreme Court as a national institution. Uncharacteristically,
Breyer's dissent begins with a rhetorical blast of a pair of "wrong" and
"wrong": "The Court was wrong to take this case. It was wrong to grant a
stay.""5 And what immediately follows is a statement of the opinion's insistent
theme, that even though "[t]he political implications of this case for the
country are momentous[,] . . . the federal legal questions presented . . . are
insubstantial," 6 and that the proper role for the Supreme Court here was to be
restrained.
Breyer's legal analysis takes apart the majority's particular arguments one
by one. But the particular force of Breyer's opinion is in Part II, in which he
pleads for the Supreme Court to stay out of this ultimate political moment in a
democracy. Under both the Constitution and Congressional statutes drafted
after the wrenching experience of the contested 1876 election, Breyer argues,
Congress has the ultimate authority and responsibility to count electoral votes.
Anticipating one of Active Liberty's themes - indeed, perhaps partly animating
it-Breyer writes: "However awkward or difficult it may be for Congress to
resolve difficult electoral disputes, Congress, being a political body, expresses
the people's will far more accurately than does an unelected Court. And the
people's will is what elections are about."17
Drawing upon Professor Alexander Bickel's writings about the 1876
election, in which Justices of the Supreme Court played a key role, Breyer
closes his opinion with lessons from that history and with anguished concern
for the Court as an institution. Describing the Justices' role in the 1876 election,
but perhaps also expressing his own anxiety about how to understand the
majority's actions in Bush v. Gore, Breyer observes that "[m]any years later,
Professor Bickel concluded that [Justice] Bradley was honest and impartial." s8
But the role of Justice Bradley and other Justices in the 1876 election "did not
denial of the writ of certiorari), in which Breyer wanted to consider the establishment of an
evidentiary privilege to limit testimony by Secret Service agents protecting the President.
Each opinion is marked by a characteristic focus on the practical consequences for the
constitutional interests at stake.
55. 531 U.S. at 144 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 155.
58. Id. at 156.
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lend that process legitimacy. Nor did it assure the public that the process had
worked fairly, guided by the law. Rather, it simply embroiled Members of the
Court in partisan conflict, thereby undermining respect for the judicial
process."59 Turning explicitly to Bush v. Gore, he wrote that one reason for
judicial self-restraint is that the "sheer momentousness" of this kind of case
"tends to unbalance judicial judgment."6O "And, above all, in this highly
politicized matter, the appearance of a split decision runs the risk of
undermining the public's confidence in the Court itself. That confidence is a
public treasure. It has been built slowly over many years, some of which were
marked by a Civil War and the tragedy of segregation." 6' Here, Breyer seems to
be reminding us of Brown v. Board of Education, which he has invoked on many
occasions as the paradigmatic case of how the Court's reserve of legitimacy
allowed it to bring transformative benefits to the justice of our country. Breyer
adds: "[That public confidence] is a vitally necessary ingredient of any
successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself....
[W]e do risk a self-inflicted wound-a wound that may harm not just the
Court, but the Nation.
62
None of the carefully polished prose about democratic participation and
judicial modesty in Active Liberty has more power or resonance than Breyer's
dissent in Bush v. Gore, hastily crafted in the midst of battle, propelled by the
particularity of litigation, and informed by the history it remembered and
recognized was being made.
I have focused thus far on Active Liberty's substantive theme about the
Constitution- the theme of democratic participation. But the book also
develops important methodological themes about how to approach the task of
legal interpretation. Judges, Breyer argues, should consider the purposes of the
legal provision in question and the practical consequences of various possible
interpretations, and not look only to the language of the law, the original intent
of its adopters, or precedent. In addition, Breyer argues, particularly in close
cases, judges should avoid wooden doctrinal formulas and rigid rules, because
they frequently need to balance a variety of factors, make pragmatic judgments,
and see matters of degree as dispositive. Approaching legal interpretation in
this way, Breyer says, will not only determine legal meaning most accurately
5g. Id. at 157.
60. Id. (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 184 (1962)).
61. Id. at 157.
62. Id. at 157-58.
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but also promote democratic values more fully and pragmatically. Breyer's
methodological arguments present an important intellectual challenge to the
interpretive method defended with intellectual force by Breyer's colleague,
Justice Antonin Scalia.
6,
The most significant criticism of Breyer's methodological approach, even
by those who praise the book, is that it leads to judicial subjectivity and legal
indeterminacy. 6' Breyer anticipates the criticism in a full section of his book
titled, with characteristic directness, "A Serious Objection." Although Breyer
does not put it this way, much of the criticism reflects an exaggerated view that
leeway can be eliminated from Supreme Court decisions. The Supreme Court,
however, is frequently interpreting general provisions of the Constitution or
imprecise provisions in federal statutes. A Justice has available a wide range of
tools for interpreting these provisions, drawing upon a variety of sources (text,
precedent, legislative history, and so forth). Inescapably, there is leeway for
choice -choice in method of interpretation, and choice in the meaning given to
a provision -choices that will inevitably be shaped in part by a judge's
experience and fiundamental beliefs and choices that will require the judge to
make reasonable judgments and not just engage in logical deduction. This is
especially so with cases decided by the Supreme Court, which are the typically
borderline and difficult cases that have no clear answers. One of Breyer's
contributions is that he acknowledges these inescapable truths and is explicit
about the basis for his own choices.
Breyer's basic answer to the concerns about subjectivity is to argue that (1)
alternative approaches have subjective elements as well; (2) his approach has
more constraints than critics will acknowledge; and (3) even if there is
somewhat more leeway for judicial choice in his method, there are more than
compensating benefits. Breyer is especially strong in summarizing the various
indeterminacies and subjectivities of originalism. Concerning constraints in his
own method, Breyer emphasizes that examining purposes and consequences
does not displace the important - and importantly constraining - role that text,
history, and precedent also should play.
Two of Breyer's other arguments about constraints warrant special
emphasis since they tend to be ignored or downplayed by his critics. The first
is Breyer's argument that his method brings to the surface factors that are often
in play but undisclosed in other methods, and that the transparency of his
method is itself an important constraint. "There is no secret. There is no
63. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997).
64. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719, 1732-36
(2006).
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hidden agenda. What you see is what you get," Breyer has stated.6' His
opinions often rest upon many diverse factors, but their relevance is
explained-and when there is a pivot point of difficulty or judgment, Breyer
will tell you. Transparency is a check on the judge, both because it disciplines
the judge's own thought and because the judge is opening himself to
disciplining criticism from others. Breyer also argues that his method requires
the judge to act with a sense of humility and caution-to defer to other
institutions often, and, when intervening, to take small bites in recognition of
the complexity of both the method and the issues. This is a point at which
Breyer's substantive theme of democratic participation and his methodological
themes come together, because they both counsel the judge to defer frequently
to other decisionmakers.
Cynics may be dismissive of invocations of humility by those with power,
but humility and caution are particularly appropriate to demand of judges in a
democracy, and Breyer's record supports that he practices what he preaches. In
the study mentioned earlier, Breyer was the most deferential to Congress of
any of the Justices on the Court. (The criticisms of Breyer's book by Robert
Bork and George Will, that it is a license for judicial activism or the
announcement of an ambitious liberal program, simply ignore what Breyer
says and the clear evidence of his cautiousness and deference to other
institutions.66) Breyer's opinions often rest upon the combination of so many
factors that they leave to the future how he would decide closely related cases,
itself an expression of a constraining humility and caution.
Of course, purposes are not always easily characterized, and consequences
not always easy to predict. The question is whether an interpretive effort - such
as originalism- that deems purposes and consequences off limits produces
better law than interpretation that gives attention to these factors and is
accompanied by a self-conscious effort to minimize (eliminate would be
impossible) the imposition of the judge's own personal value choices. Breyer's
ultimate argument is that even if his method may sometimes provide judges
more room for judgment than a strict originalist or textualist approach, there
are more than compensating benefits -a law that better carries out the
purposes of the Constitution and of statutes, and that better serves the country.
Here, of course, Breyer's method merges with his understandings of
substantive constitutional meaning. For example, to say that any restriction on
speech in a negative liberty sense triggers strictest scrutiny might be more
determinate than Breyer's approach, but for Breyer it would be wrong. Rigid
65. Breyer, supra note 13, at 17.
66. Robert H. Bork, Enforcing a "Mood," NEw CRITERION, Feb. 2006, at 63; George F. Will, Mr.
Breyer's 'Modesty,'NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2005, at 72.
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doctrinal rules might reduce a judge's leeway for judgment, but Breyer believes
that the right constitutional meaning is often found in a context-specific
balancing of multiple factors, judgments of "proportionality,"6" and matters of
"degree."
68
A further question, which Breyer does not really address, is whether his
method can work well in the hands of the ordinary judge without Breyer's
social understanding and good sense. It takes a true virtuoso to play
Beethoven's late piano sonatas -and the ordinary pianist would be advised to
play simpler though inferior music. In the hands of others, perhaps the results
would be less pleasing. This is a common critique by those who favor legal
rules over standards,6" and it is certainly a fair question to ask about Breyer's
approach.
As both Richard Posner and Cass Sunstein note in this issue," Breyer's
policy orientation does a considerable amount of the work in the decisions he
reaches -his commitment to democratic participation and his methodology do
not by themselves produce his results. Other judges might conceivably invoke
his themes and use his method and reach results that I, for one, would cheer
less, because they draw different implications from a commitment to
democratic participation, identify purposes of legal provisions that are less
congruent with my understanding, and assess likely consequences in less
plausible and less insightful ways. But Breyer's method requires transparency
at the points at which judgment or policy comes into play, and transparency
not only constrains but also invites candid dialogue. Breyer's method also
insists upon a genuine attitude of humility and deference, and that prevents
excessive judicial intrusion in democratic processes. If you believe, as Breyer
believes, that leeway and some measure of policymaking are inescapable parts
of judicial decisions in the distinctively difficult, borderline, and contested
issues that reach the Supreme Court, the comparative advantages of Breyer's
approach become clearer. It may not eliminate debates in particular cases, but it
67. BREYER, supra note i, at 49. For a brief discussion of Breyer's reliance on the concept of
proportionality, see Gewirtz, supra note 33, at 195-98.
68. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority
believes [my] conclusions rest upon practical judgments that at most suggest the statute is
unwise, not that it is unconstitutional. Legal distinctions, however, are often matters of
degree. And in this case the failings of degree are so serious that they amount to failings of
constitutional kind." (citations omitted)).
69. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 1o6 HARv. L. REV, 22 (1992).
70. Richard A. Posner, Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet, 115 YALE L.J. 1699 (20o6);
Sunstein, supra note 64.
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puts those debates on a more open terrain. And it leaves great room for debate
to be had, and choices made, in more democratic institutions.
I noted at the outset that Active Liberty should be seen as a work of
induction, in which Breyer discerned a pattern and themes in his earlier judicial
opinions. Perhaps not surprisingly, writing this book (and its precursors, the
2001 Madison Lecture and the 2004 Tanner Lectures) seems to be having an
effect on Breyer's continuing judicial work.
I have already noted the apparent effect his democratic participation theme
seems to have had on his approach to the 2003 campaign finance cases and
affirmative action cases (in which he did not write major opinions). But we can
also see the democratic participation theme playing out in less prominent cases
in which Breyer has written opinions. In Board of Education v. Earls," for
example, Breyer split off from his liberal colleagues and concurred in a
judgment upholding a school district's policy of conducting drug testing of
students participating in competitive extracurricular activities. At a pivotal
point in his concurrence he notes:
When trying to resolve this kind of close question involving the
interpretation of constitutional values, I believe it important that the
school board provided an opportunity for the airing of these differences
at public meetings designed to give the entire community the
opportunity to be able to participate in developing the drug policy. The
board used this democratic, participatory process to uncover and to
resolve differences, giving weight to the fact that the process . . .
revealed little, if any, objection to the proposed testing program.72
In another case, Ring v. Arizona, Breyer actually reversed his conclusion in an
earlier case, and concluded that "the Eighth Amendment requires that a jury,
not a judge, make the decision to sentence a defendant to death."73 1His
conclusion rests upon his view that, given the extensive debates about the
appropriateness of the death penalty, jury sentencing "will help assure that, in
a particular case, the community indeed believes application of the death
penalty is appropriate, not 'cruel,' 'unusual,' or otherwise unwarranted."7 4 Put
71. 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
72. Id. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
73- 536 U.S. 584, 614 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
74 Id. at 6 18.
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another way, the jury's role will provide fuller democratic participation by the
community in the death penalty decision.
We can also see a new self-conscious deployment of his methodological
emphasis on looking to purposes and consequences in interpreting laws. Most
striking is Breyer's application of this method-which was fully articulated in
the 2004 Tanner Lectures- in the two 2005 cases involving public displays of
the Ten Commandments that were decided after he delivered those lectures.
7
The Ten Commandments cases are especially noteworthy because Breyer
ended up being the pivotal Justice in each case, providing the decisive fifth vote
to allow the display in one case and the decisive fifth vote to disallow it in the
other. 76 As the only Justice to reach different conclusions in the companion
cases, he was at the center of the Court, but there alone. It cannot have been an
easy place to come to rest. But there is nothing tentative in Breyer's opinions -
the tone is self-confident, the voice of a judge comfortable with his method of
decision and where it has led him. And the method is explicidy all about the
purposes of the Establishment Clause and the consequences of one
interpretation over another' - Breyer's most developed use of these concepts in
any opinion he has written.
Breyer's earlier opinions, we have seen, evolved into this book. His recent
opinions demonstrate that his book is now producing evolutions in his
opinions, which are making more self-conscious use of ideas developed in his
book.
III. CIVIC ENGAGEMENT
One final part of the sketch is necessary: Breyer's theme concerning the
citizen's active participation in public life is expressed not only in his legal ideas
but also in his own activities of civic engagement. Several times in his book
Breyer quotes John Adams's phrase extolling citizens' "positive passion for the
public good"'8 - and the phrase fits Breyer himself, not just as a description of
his personality but also of the way he understands his judicial role. A Supreme
75. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, Harvard University Tanner Lectures on
Human Values (Nov. 17-19, 2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/spll-17-o4.html. Indeed, after the Tanner Lectures were delivered and he had
written his opinion in the Ten Commandments case, Breyer added a section on those cases
to the chapter on methodology in Active Liberty. BREYER, supra note i, at 122-24.
76. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005); McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S.
Ct. 2722 (2005).
77. Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2869 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
78. BREYER, supra note 1, at 3, 135.
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Court Justice can help to educate society. A Supreme Court Justice needs to
understand society.
He believes that one of his roles is to educate and engage the general public
about the Supreme Court and about our government institutions. His opinions
are remarkably jargon-free, and, for all of their analytic brilliance, they are
usually written as if they are to be read by ordinary citizens. His opinions have
no footnotes (they are full of citations, of course, but these are embedded in the
text), which I take to be a symbolic assertion that his opinions are arguments to
the public, not a scholar's writings. He is one of the Court's most active (and
wittiest) participants at oral argument; and because oral arguments often
receive as much press coverage as the Court's actual opinions, this in practice,
if not intent, provides another channel for him to educate the public. He sees
great value in amicus briefs filed with the Court since they inform him about
the real world of things and the potential consequences of legal rulings.79 But
he also remains involved with society directly.
One reason that Active Liberty is an important book is that it aspires to reach
a wider audience of readers than legal scholars, other judges, and lawyers.'s
The book seeks to contribute to the public's understanding of not only the
Supreme Court, but also, and perhaps above all, the public's own role in our
democratic system. Justice Breyer has done a remarkable number of interviews
related to the publication of this book -for example, he has done television,
radio, print and other interviews with George Stephanopoulos (ABC News),
Larry King (CNN), Jim Lehrer (PBS), Charlie Rose (PBS), Linda Greenhouse
(New York Times), Jeffrey Toobin (New Yorker), Nina Totenberg (NPR), and
Stuart Taylor (National Journal), among others. While taking pains to explain
how the Supreme Court works, these interviews all emphasize the public's own
responsibilities to participate in our political life, and are acts of public
encouragement.
Even before the book appeared, Breyer was willing to speak to general
audiences, to university entities, to bar associations and other nonprofit
organizations, and to participate in conferences of all sorts. 8 Some of his
colleagues lead quite insular lives as Justices, whether out of a sense of self-
protection or propriety, but Breyer has resisted that. He participates in
79. Id. at 41-42.
so. Breyer has recounted that the origin of this book was a meeting at the Carnegie Foundation
where he, Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy were discussing how to teach high school
students about the Constitution. See Breyer, supra note 13, at 7, 8.
Si. A partial listing of Breyer's speeches and public appearances is provided on the Supreme
Court's website at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/speeches.html
(last visited Mar. 22, 20o6).
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Washington, D.C.'s social life, and he spends considerable time in his longtime
home of Cambridge, Massachusetts, as a member of that community. (Indeed,
the book jacket's description of Breyer has only two sentences: the first says
that he is an associate justice of the Supreme Court, and the second says that
"He is a resident of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C." -in
that order.)
Like most of his colleagues, at the Court he often receives delegations from
foreign countries, most typically judges from other countries' courts. In turn,
like other of his colleagues, he also regularly accepts invitations to speak abroad
about the American legal system- sometimes under the auspices of the U.S.
Department of State. In this respect, he is essentially a diplomat. The American
legal system and our commitment to the rule of law is widely admired around
the world - it is part of our "soft power" as a country. A Supreme Court Justice
speaking to a foreign audience about our country and its legal system brings
particular attention to them, improves understanding of our system, and
contributes to America's standing in these countries." In the course of these
visits and exchanges, Justice Breyer himself learns about the work of foreign
courts. This, along with the increasing practice of lawyers in cases before the
Supreme Court bringing foreign materials to the Court's attention, has made
Justice Breyer a leading proponent of the idea that it is sometimes valuable for
our courts to consider the experiences of other countries in the course of
making decisions -not because those foreign decisions in any way bind us or
shape the meaning of U.S. legal texts, but because they may provide useful
insights and even empirical experience with particular kinds of issues."s
Breyer also believes that a Supreme Court Justice is part of the American
government system, not apart from it. This understanding of his role is
expressed in numerous and, at times, unusual ways. For example, Breyer is
single-handedly carrying forward the old tradition that members of the
Supreme Court attend the State of the Union address. The rest of his
colleagues no longer attend. (This year was an exception, apparently because
the State of the Union address took place the same day that Justice Samuel
Alito was sworn into office.) The attendance of Justices at the State of the
Union address, however traditional, certainly produces some awkward
moments, since the President's remarks are often highly political and
82. For example, Justice Breyer also regularly attends the annual Global Constitutionalism
Seminar at Yale Law School, which brings together justices from supreme courts and
constitutional courts around the world with the Yale faculty to discuss issues of common
interest.
83. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address Before the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 265 (2003).
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nowadays members of Congress frequently either stand to cheer or put on
sullen expressions for the TV cameras; an attending Justice typically sits
benignly, neither cheering nor disapproving. But Breyer's persistence in
attending reflects, I think, not only his sense that members of the Court should
participate in this symbolic event. It also reflects one aspect of Breyer's
characteristic optimism: Yes, we have separate branches of government and
they each must check the other; but we are in the end one Union with a set of
common purposes.
Breyer believes this. His public interviews and speeches are filled with
optimism.8 4 He emphasizes again and again the large area of common ground
within the United States, in understandings about the Constitution, and even
concerning cases that come to the Supreme Court. His optimism is expressed
not simply in overt expressions of faith in American institutions, but in his
basic problem-solving style. He believes that common ground can be found.
And when a problem can't be solved-in the sense that common ground for a
sensible solution can't be found-he emphasizes that the question at issue is a
close one, that each side has something to be said for it. Many others have
contrasted Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia in terms of their interpretative
methods and judicial philosophies. But there is also a marked contrast in their
temperaments, including their judicial temperament: One is a witty
provocateur, the other is a cheerful problem solver. They share a zest for
expressing their different temperaments, but one emphasizes differences and
enjoys the posture of adversary, the other emphasizes commonalities and
enjoys the role of conciliator.
Breyer's optimism, especially about American institutions, explains why
Bush v. Gore was such a significant event for him -it was a major challenge to
his faith in the essential wisdom of our institutions and the nonpartisanship
and professionalism of judging. But, significantly, in his limited public
comments on the case since it was decided he has said only two things: First,
he thinks he was right; and, second, the country accepted the Court's decision,
and this is a sign of how strong our institutions are and how strong the public's
faith in our institutions is.8s One senses that he has bracketed Bush v. Gore in
his understanding of both the Supreme Court and the country. It was a terrible
mistake, but we have moved on-and we can move on without drawing harsh
lessons that Supreme Court decisionmaking is inherently or pervasively
partisan or corrupt. It was a terrible mistake, but our country will survive it-
and Breyer's faith has survived it.
84. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 13, at 39.
85. Id. at 38-39.
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Of course, one consequence of Bush v. Gore is that it indeed did change
Breyer's life. President Bush is reshaping the Supreme Court with his talented
and strongly conservative appointments, and this has made it more likely that
Breyer will remain in the minority bloc for the foreseeable future, perhaps for
the remainder of his career. It is difficult to see Breyer playing a larger role as a
consensus builder now that Justice O'Connor has left the Court. There is the
chance, of course, that given the lawyerly professionalism of the two new
appointees, John Roberts and Samuel Alito - and the fact that they, like Breyer,
enjoy the detailed analysis of cases and seem often to decide cases narrowly-
Breyer will find significant areas of common ground with them, even in
borderline and particularly important cases. In any event, although usually
characterized as part of the conservative bloc, Justice Kennedy will retain his
comparatively centrist and at times unpredictable place on the Court, so Breyer
still might play a role as a shaper of majority positions if common ground is
found with Justice Kennedy.
In that role, it is important to remember that Breyer himself is at times an
unpredictable liberal. To mention just a few examples, he has split with
Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg on a variety of important cases,
including some free speech cases,8 6 one of the Ten Commandments cases,8' the
affirmative action case involving the University of Michigan's undergraduate
college,"8 and some criminal procedure cases,8 9 among others. There is also, of
course, the chance that a Democrat will be elected President in 2008 and that
the Court can be reshaped yet again before Breyer retires so that he becomes a
shaper of more progressive majority positions. But at the moment all of this is
most uncertain.
Thus, Breyer is a judge of extraordinary quality, but has no clear majority
on the Court to follow his lead. If this does not change, what will Breyer's path
be? Greatness as a Justice, as the examples of John Marshall Harlan, Louis
Brandeis, and Robert Jackson demonstrate, does not require a commanding
role as leader of majorities. It can be based on a powerful judicial identity; a set
of ideas; a method and an integrity that gain deeper recognition and influence
over time; and even influential roles played outside the Court's daily work. We
86. Ashcroft v. ACLU 542 U.S. 656, 676-91 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting); United States v. Am.
Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 215-20 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 535-41 (2oo1) (Breyer, J., concurring); United States v. Playboy Entm't Group,
Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 835-47 (200o) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868-73 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).
88. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 281-82 (2003) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. E.g., Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822
(2002).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal 1697
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
can predict that, for Justice Breyer, the theme and method set forth in Active
Liberty will give his ideas an influence that individual judicial opinions almost
never can have. He will continue to be a powerful individual voice on the Court
with a distinctive approach, method, and set of ideas - implementing the
pragmatic strain in American thought in a way rarely seen within the American
judiciary. Over time, one can imagine that Justice Breyer will find other specific
areas of law that he can rethink in detail with a new perspective, as he has
already done with his innovative approach to the First Amendment. One can
also expect him to continue his own activities of civil engagement outside the
courthouse, filling crucial gaps in the American public's understanding of our
public institutions, and acting as an unusually effective public diplomat for
American legal institutions and for the United States abroad.
He may even find the time for other important books like Active Liberty. We
are lucky to have this one.
Paul Gewirtz is the Potter Stewart Professor of Constitutional Law, Yale Law
School. He is especially grateful to Chad Golder for his extensive and invaluable help
with this effort, and to Robert Wiygul for his excellent research assistance. In the
interests offull disclosure, the author notes that he was thanked by Justice Breyer on
the acknowledgments page ofActive Liberty.
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TH AL LA JO RAL
RICHARD A. POSNER
Justice Breyer Throws Down the Gauntlet
A Supreme Court Justice writing a book about constitutional law is like a
dog walking on his hind legs: The wonder is not that it is done well but that it
is done at all. The dog's walking is inhibited by anatomical limitations, the
Justice's writing by political ones. Supreme Court Justices are powerful
political figures; they cannot write with the freedom and candor of more
obscure people. But just as Shakespeare managed to write great plays under
official censorship, so Justice Breyer has managed to write a good book under
self-censorship.
In recent years, the initiative in constitutional debate has passed to the
conservatives. They have proposed, and to an extent achieved, a rolling back of
liberal doctrines (notably in regard to states' rights, police practices, and
executive power) and of the methodology of loose construction that enabled
liberal Justices to provide a plausible justification for those doctrines. The
liberals continue to win a significant share of victories, in such areas as
homosexual rights, affirmative action, and capital punishment, but for the
most part their stance, their outlook, has been defensive: defense of the Warren
Court and Roe v. Wade. Justice Breyer is a liberal (though a moderate one), but
he wants to do more than defend liberal decisions, doctrines, and methods
piecemeal. He wants an overarching approach to set against the "textualism"
and "originalism" of his judicial foes. His book articulates and defends such an
approach, which he calls "active liberty."
The book is short, and not only clearly written but written on a level that
should make it accessible to an audience wider than an audience of judges and
lawyers. And despite its brevity and simplicity it will be welcomed by
constitutional lawyers, perhaps even by some of Breyer's colleagues, as a
rallying point for liberal constitutional thought. It is a serious, and perhaps an
important-it is certainly likely to be an influential- contribution to
constitutional debate. The short book of Scalia's against which Breyer is
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writing1 has been cited in more than a thousand law review articles.' Breyer can
expect similar attention to his book.
But while acknowledging its merits and likely influence, I do not find Active
Liberty convincing, and will devote the bulk of this Review to explaining why.
So first-what is "active liberty"? Breyer, following Benjamin Constant,
distinguishes between the "liberty of the ancients" and the "liberty of the
moderns," and aligns active liberty with the former. He fails to note that
Constant was writing against the "liberty of the ancients," which Rousseau had
introduced into French political thought with tragic results, and in favor of the
"liberty of the moderns."3 To Constant, the liberty of the ancients signified the
collective exercise of sovereignty devoid of any concept of individual rights
against the state.4 It was an extreme version of what we now call "direct
democracy," which is illustrated by referenda in California and Switzerland
and by the New England town meeting. The liberty of the moderns, by
contrast, is liberty from state oppression. It is what Isaiah Berlin called
"negative liberty."' It is what citizens of Athens and of revolutionary France
lacked. Its instruments include representative democracy (not direct
democracy, as in ancient Athens), separation of powers, federalism, and the
type of legally enforceable rights against government that are found in the Bill
of Rights.
Breyer understands by liberty of the ancients the liberty that Athenian
citizens enjoyed for much of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.6 by reason of
1. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
Scalia's is a short book, all right, but it is not really his short book. His contribution to it is
limited to a lead essay (entitled, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws) and a reply to critics, id.
at 129. See also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
2. The search that produced this figure was of articles in Westlaw's JLR (Journals & Law
Reviews) database. Despite the extreme brevity of Scalia's discussion of constitutional as
distinct from statutory interpretation in SCALIA, supra note i, at 37-47, my impression is that
most of the law review commentary has focused on his approach to constitutional
interpretation.
3. BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the Moderns, in
POLITICAL WRITINGS 309 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., 1988). With reference to
Rousseau, see id. at 319-20.
4. Id. at 311-12.
s. ISAIAH BEL.N, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 169-78 (Henry Hardy ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2002) (1958).
6. JOSIAH OBER, THE ATHENIAN REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON ANCIENT GREEK DEMOCRACY AND
POLITICAL THEORY 31 (1996); see also R. K. SINCLAIR, DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION IN
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the fact that their city was a democracy. Constant, on the contrary, believed
Athens to have been the ancient state that "most resembles the modern ones,"
7
and Sparta a better example of the liberty of the ancients.8 But Athens was
actually an excellent example of that liberty. The Athenian Assembly, to which
all citizens belonged, had plenary power; there were no legislators other than
the citizens themselves when attending its sessions. To prevent the emergence
of a political class, the few executive officials were chosen mainly by lot, for
one-year terms, though some were elected and could be reelected.9 Similarly,
there were no judges except randomly selected subsets of citizens -jurors who
voted without deliberating, unguided by jury instructions, since there were no
judges to give such instructions. For that matter, there was no legal profession,
though orators such as Demosthenes would draft speeches for the litigants to
give at trial. There was plenty of litigation, but no concept that people had
rights to life, liberty, or property that could be enforced against the polis. The
only justice was popular justice.
To lodge executive and judicial power in randomly chosen citizens, and
legislative power in whatever citizens choose to attend legislative sessions, is to
carry self-government about as far as it can be carried. It is town meeting
government writ large. It is not a feasible model for a nation of 300 million
people. Breyer knows this, though he says that the Court should be doing more
to promote the "active liberty of the ancients, " ' ° and underscores the point by
saying that "'active liberty' ...bears some similarities to ... Isaiah Berlin's
concept of 'positive liberty.' That was Berlin's term for the "liberty of the
ancients" as revived by Rousseau and extended, Berlin thought, by modem
totalitarians!'2 Breyer does not want to turn the United States into a direct
democracy on the model of ancient Athens, or on any other model. He says
that "' [d] elegated democracy' need not represent a significant departure from
ATHENS 68, 8o (1988). Some of the other Greek city states were also democratic during this
period.
7. CONSTANT, supra note 3, at 312.
8. Id. at 310-11, 314-16.
9. JOHN V.A. FINE, THE ANCIENT GREEKS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 390-402 (1983); SINCLAIR,
supra note 6, at 68, 8o. So even the Athenians flinched from the full implications of direct
democracy. SINCLAIR, supra note 6, at 193-95; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 154 (2003) (discussing the problematic nature of
representative "democracy").
10. STEPHEN BREYER, ACrIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 5
(2005). He contrasts "active liberty" with "modern liberty." Id.
ii. Id. at 137 n.6.
12. See BERLIN, supra note 5, at 19o-91.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
democratic principle,""3 and by "delegated democracy" he means simply-
representative democracy. All he really wants to do is to interpret the
Constitution in a manner that will promote his conception of democratic
choice by sweeping away obstacles to such choice. His project resembles that of
John Hart Ely (cited by Breyer, though only in passing'4), who argued that the
major thrust of the Warren Court had been to make American government
more democratic, 5 but not democratic in the Athenian sense.
Because he is a judge, Breyer cannot acknowledge that he wants to impose
his concept of active liberty on the Constitution. Convention requires him to
find the concept in the Constitution. Manfully, he tries. He recognizes that it is
an uphill struggle: "The primarily democratic nature of the Constitution's
governmental structure has not always seemed obvious. ''16 Indeed not -and for
the excellent reason that the structure is not "primarily democratic." It is
republican, with a democratic component. The Constitution's rejection of
monarchy (no king), aristocracy (no titles of nobility), and a national church
(no religious oaths of office) was revolutionary; but the governmental
structure that it created bore no resemblance to that of ancient Athens and was,
and remains, incompletely democratic.
. Of the major components of the federal government -the executive branch,
consisting of the President and Vice President and other high officials; the
judiciary; the Senate; and the House of Representatives-only the last was to
be elected by the people. And since the Constitution created no right to vote
and allowed the states to fix the eligibility criteria for voters for members of the
House (except that the criteria had to be the same as those the state prescribed
for voters or members of the lower house of its own legislature) states could
limit the franchise by imposing property or other qualifications for voting. The
President and Vice President were to be chosen by an Electoral College whose
members would in turn be chosen by the states according to rules adopted by
each state legislature; there was no requirement that those rules provide for
popular election of the members of the College. Other executive branch
officials would be appointed by the President or by the judges. Senators would
be appointed by state legislatures. Supreme Court Justices (and other federal
judges, if Congress took up the option conferred on it by the Constitution of
creating federal courts in addition to the Supreme Court) would be appointed
by the President, subject to senatorial confirmation, for life. Political parties
13. BREYER, supra note 1o, at 23.
14. Id. at 146 n.14.
15. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
16. BREYER, supra note 1o, at 21.
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were not envisaged; the best men would rule, rather than the survivors of party
competition. There was not a trace of direct democracy in the Constitution: no
provision for initiatives, referenda, or recalls. The Framers purported to be
speaking on behalf of "We the People," as the preamble states, but there is no
novelty in adopting a nondemocratic regime by plebiscite; ask Napoleon. Even
the ratification of the Constitution was by state conventions rather than by
direct popular vote. The Constitution guarantees a republican form of
government (presumably similar though not identical to the republican form
of government created by the Constitution) to each state, but not a democratic
government.
If, as Breyer states, the Framers of the Constitution had "confidence in
democracy as the best check upon government's oppressive tendencies,"17 why
is there so little democracy, and none of it direct democracy, in the document
they wrote? What we see in the structure of the original Constitution is not an
echo of Athens but an adaptation of the institutions of the British eighteenth-
century monarchy to a republican ideology. The President corresponds to the
king; he exercises the traditional monarchical prerogatives of pardoning,
conducting foreign affairs, appointing executive officials and judges, and
commanding the armed forces. He is of course not directly elected. The Senate
and the Supreme Court correspond to the House of Lords, and the House of
Representatives corresponds to the House of Commons; elected, but by a
restricted franchise. Subsequent amendments and changing practices and
institutions made the Constitution more democratic, but Breyer insists that the
original Constitution, the Constitution of 1787, was animated by the spirit of
Pericles. That is untenable. There is irony in an anti-originalist trying-and
failing - to give a historical pedigree to his anti-originalist approach.
Breyer's lack of interest in the actual texture or political background and
suppositions of the Constitution is consistent with the loose-constructionist
approach that he champions (quite properly in my opinion). But he would
have been well advised to forget Athens, accept Constant's and Berlin's
criticisms of the liberty of the ancients, cut loose his concept of active liberty
from that unattractive precedent, and acknowledge that he is trying to improve
representative democracy, a project antithetical to that of restoring the liberty
of the ancients.
After setting forth his concept of active liberty and trying to give it a
constitutional genealogy, Breyer offers a series of illustrations of how the
concept would, if accepted as the true spirit of the Constitution, shape
17. Id. at 23.
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constitutional law. He begins with free speech.' s He contrasts political and
commercial speech, arguing that the former is entitled to much greater
protection because it is central to democracy. But he also defends, against free
speech objections, campaign finance laws that limit political advertising.' 9
The notion of the primacy of political speech is a common one, but it is
misleading and unhelpful. Of course it is possible to imagine restrictions on
political speech that would do more harm than restrictions on commercial
speech; compare a blanket prohibition of criticizing officials with a prohibition
against false advertising of diet pills. But it is also possible to imagine
restrictions on political speech that do less harm than restrictions on
commercial speech; compare a prohibition against advocating suicide bombing
with a prohibition against all price advertising. And where do scientific and
artistic expression fall in Breyer's hierarchy of speech categories? He doesn't
say. It is especially easy to imagine restrictions on freedom of scientific inquiry
that would be more destructive of the nation's power and prosperity than
restrictions on political expression. Perhaps, other things being equal,
restrictions on political speech are more serious than restrictions on other
speech because they are more difficult to remove by the political process; but
other things are rarely equal.
Breyer does not discuss the particulars of campaign finance reform. He is
content to argue that placing some limits on contributions to political
campaigns should not be held to infringe freedom of speech. He recognizes
that to tell someone you can't spend $i million to buy a commercial extolling
the candidate of your choice curtails expression; but he thinks that limiting the
ability of the rich to spend unlimited amounts on campaign advertising is
justified by its contribution to active liberty. Interpreted in the light of active
liberty, the First Amendment is to be understood "as seeking to facilitate a
conversation among ordinary citizens that will encourage their informed
participation in the electoral process,"2" and campaign finance laws have a
"similar objective." 2' They "seek to democratize the influence that money can
bring to bear upon the electoral process, thereby building public confidence in
that process, broadening the base of a candidate's meaningful financial
support, and encouraging greater public participation."' This is a little vague,
but the basic idea seems to be that if there are no limitations on individual
18. Id. at 39.
i9. Id. at 43-50.
zo. Id. at 46.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 47.
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campaign contributions, candidates will confine their fundraising to a handful
of fat cats and the ordinary people will become disaffected- alienated from the
political process-because they will assume that policy is shaped by the
interests of the rich and that the people's voice is not heard.
No evidence for this speculation is offered, and it is not very plausible. For
one thing, the wealthy are not a monolith; they have competing interests. For
another, they do not have the votes, and so their political advertisements are
aimed at average people-and it is odd to think that the fewer political
advertisements there are, the greater the amount of political participation there
will be. That is like thinking that curtailing commercial advertising would
result in more consumption. Furthermore, if some candidates court the
wealthy, others will be spurred to raise money from the nonwealthy-
something the Internet has made easier to do, as we learned in the last
presidential election.
I am not suggesting that Breyer is wrong to think that campaign finance
laws do not violate the First Amendment. If there is no evidence that they
promote active liberty, there is also no evidence that they curtail free speech
significantly. I am old fashioned in regarding the invalidation of a federal
statute as a momentous step that should not be taken unless the
unconstitutionality of the statute is clear, and the unconstitutionality of
campaign finance laws is not clear. But active liberty does not advance the
analysis because it does not yield an administrable standard. Breyer tells us that
the proper standard for judging the constitutionality of a campaign finance law
is one of "proportionality."2 3 The law's "negative impact upon those primarily
wealthier citizens who wish to engage in more electoral communication" is
weighed against
its positive impact upon the public's confidence in, and ability to
communicate through, the electoral process.... Does the statute strike
a reasonable balance between electoral speech-restricting and speech-
enhancing consequences? Or does it instead impose restrictions on
speech that are disproportionate when measured against their electoral
and speech-related benefits, taking into account the kind, the
importance, and the extent of those benefits, as well as the need for the
restriction in order to secure them? 4
"The inquiry is complex," writes Breyer.2" No; it is indeterminate.
23. Id. at 49.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 50.
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"Weighing imponderables" sounds like an oxymoron (since
"imponderable" is from the Latin ponderare, meaning "to weigh"), but isn't
quite, because often a judge can know, even without quantification, that one
interest is greater than another just as one can rank competing employees by
their contributions to their firm without being able to quantify the
contributions. (Ordinal ranking is simpler than cardinal.) In a negligence case,
for example, neither the burden of precautions nor the probability and
magnitude of the accident that will occur if the precautions are not taken may
be quantified or even quantifiable, yet it may be apparent that there is a grave
risk of a serious accident that could easily be averted (negligence), or that the
cost of the precautions would be disproportionate to the slight risk of a minor
accident (no negligence). But key terms in Breyer's test, such as "impact upon
the public's confidence in, and ability to communicate through, the electoral
process," and the "importance" of a challenged law's "electoral and speech-
related benefits," are so indefinite that they cannot guide decision.
The broader problem is that abstractions like "democracy" and "active
liberty" are so vague and encompassing that they can be deployed on either
side of most constitutional questions. A decision invalidating a statute on
constitutional grounds may seem undemocratic, but even if it is not a
democracy-enhancing decision (as reapportionment decisions are widely
thought to be), it can be defended as an application of the "higher democracy"
embodied in the Constitution. So originalists are democrats along with the
loose constructionists. Likewise federalists, who want to honor the democratic
choices made at the state and local level, and nationalists who want to honor
the democratic choices made at the federal level. And are judges more
democratic when they are giving legislators a helping hand (loose
construction) or when they are sticking to the statutory language (strict
construction) ?
Breyer's next set of illustrations of constitutional law as inflected by active
liberty concerns federalism. At first glance this seems surprising. Federalism is
especially remote from Athenian democracy. But Breyer argues plausibly that
in a nation as large as the United States, a federal system is needed to give the
citizenry a sense of full participation in political life, since issues at the state and
local level are often both more important and more intelligible to people than
issues involving the national government. 6 Yet his leading example of how
federalism understood as a helpmeet to active liberty should shape
constitutional doctrine is unconvincing. It concerns the question of whether
the federal government should be allowed to compel state officials to assist in
26. Id. at 56-57.
17o6 Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:1699 20o6
JUSTICE BREYER THROWS DOWN THE GAUNTLET
enforcing federal law, as by requiring sheriffs to check on compliance with
federal gun laws.27 The Supreme Court has said no,"8 and Breyer disagrees,
arguing that the federal government, if it can't force state officials to assist in
administering federal programs, will need a larger bureaucracy and so will
expand at the expense of state and local government. That is possible, but if the
Court allowed commandeering, as Breyer wants, there would probably be
more federal programs because some of their costs would have been shifted
from the federal treasury to the states.
He challenges the recent decisions in which the Supreme Court has limited
federal regulation by defining interstate commerce more narrowly than it had
done since the 193Os. 2 9 His argument is that federal laws based on an expansive
understanding of interstate commerce are democratic because "the public has
participated in the legislative process at the national level."30 But his active
liberty defense of federalism was that political participation at the national level
is less participatory than that at the state or local level. It therefore is unclear
why he criticizes the Court for expanding the scope for political participation at
the state or local level by narrowing the scope for federal regulation.
Here as elsewhere in the book Breyer chides his colleagues for failing to
consider the consequences of their decisions. He wants them to "ask about the
consequences of decision-making on the active liberty that federalism seeks to
further" and to "consider the practical effects on local democratic self-
government of decisions interpreting the Constitution's principles of
federalism."31 Breyer's emphasis on consequences is consistent with the
common view of him as a pragmatic judge. I think that there is considerable
truth to this view. He is the author of two of the most important pragmatic
decisions of recent years- his majority opinion in the Booker case, an opinion
that saved the federal sentencing guidelines from what would have been, in my
opinion, a senseless invalidation of them,"2 and his balance-tipping concurring
opinion in the Texas Ten Commandments case,33 which spared us a national
search-and-destroy mission against all displays of the Ten Commandments on
27. Id. at 58-63.
28. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
149 (1992).
ag. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2ooo); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
3o. BREYER, supra note lo, at 62.
31. Id. at 63.
32. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005); see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court,
2oo4 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REv. 31, 56-57 (2005).
33. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2868 (2005); see Posner, supra note 32, at 99-102.
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public property. Not that he is a completely consistent pragmatist. 4 Nor does
his pragmatism escape the objection that pragmatism, as actually practiced by
judges, fails to cabin judicial discretion. The pragmatist eschews theory and
focuses on consequences, which is fine by me, but if the consequences cannot
be measured or even estimated but only conjectured, the judge is left at large.
As with Breyer's rhetorical questions about the effects of campaign finance
laws, his suggestion that judges "ask about the consequences of decision-
making" for "active liberty" and "consider the practical effects" on "local
democratic self-government" founders on the inability to measure the effects of
a statute or judicial decision on "active liberty" or "local democratic self-
government." When would one know that some law had impaired such elusive
phenomena?
The chapter on federalism endorses an approach proposed many years ago
by Alexander Bickel and more recently by Guido Calabresi for promoting
"dialogue" between courts and legislatures: 3
Through a hard-look requirement, for example, the Court would
communicate to Congress the precise constitutional difficulty the Court
has with the statute at issue without resorting to permanent
invalidation. Congress, in reenacting the statute, would revisit the
matter and respond to the Court's concerns. A clear-statement rule
would have the Court call upon Congress to provide an unambiguous
articulation of the precise contours and reach of a given policy solution.
Those doctrines would lead the Court to focus upon the thoroughness
of the legislature's consideration of a matter.
36
This kind of coercive, one-sided dialogue would tie Congress in knots. Offered
by Breyer as an olive branch to a democratically elected branch of government,
it actually would expand judicial power at the expense of the legislature by
invalidating legislation not because it clearly violated the Constitution but
because it failed to meet the Court's criteria of thoroughness, clarity, and
precision. "Thoroughness" is an especially unsatisfactory criterion of
constitutionality.
Next follows a chapter on informational privacy. Breyer points out sensibly
that new technologies have altered the landscape of privacy. Courts should
34. Id. at 96-99.
35. See, e.g., Quill v. Vacco, 8o F.3d 716, 738-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring), rev'd,
521 U.S. 793 (1997); United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 196o Term-Foreword: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1961).
36. BPEYER, supra note io, at 64-65.
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hesitate to offer definitive answers when there is so much uncertainty and
change. Instead the answers should be allowed to "bubble up from below" in a
process "best described as a form of participatory democracy."37 He illustrates
with a decision in which the Court held that a federal statute that forbade
broadcasting a private cell phone conversation, which some unknown person
had intercepted with a scanner and delivered to a radio station, violated the
First Amendment.' 8 Breyer wrote a concurring opinion that emphasized three
features of the case and indicated that he might have voted differently had any
of them been missing: The radio station had been an innocent recipient of the
tape of the illegally intercepted conversation; the conversation, which was
between two union officials, was a matter of public interest because it
contained a threat (though it seems to have been just talk) of damaging
property; and the conversation was about business rather than about intimate
private matters, so the affront to privacy in broadcasting the conversation was
less than it might have been. 9
All this has little to do with "participatory democracy," or for that matter
with new technologies. The decision subordinates the privacy of conversations
to the interest of the media in disseminating matters that the public may be
interested in learning about. The principal effect of the decision may be to
discourage the use of analog cell phones for discussion of sensitive matters.
(Digital cell phones are harder to eavesdrop on than wired telephones, and
most cell phones being sold nowadays are digital.) The irony is that the media
know well the value of privacy of communications for themselves - newspapers
and other news media are desperate to avoid having to identify their reporters'
confidential sources-but do not respect the same privacy interests of the
subjects of their stories. Decisions that fail to protect the privacy of
communications may result in fewer communications, with a resulting loss to
freedom of speech and so, one might have thought, to active liberty.
Breyer turns next to affirmative action and declares his agreement with
certain "practical considerations"4" that Justice O'Connor had mentioned in
her opinion for the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger,4" the case that upheld the
affirmative-action program of the Michigan Law School. Those considerations
are that American businesses and the American military consider affirmative
action important to their operations and that effective integration of a group
37. Id. at 70.
38. Barmicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
39. Id. at 535-41.
40. BREYER, supra note io, at 81.
41. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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into the nation's civic life requires that "the path to leadership be visibly open
to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. ' 42 What
O'Connor seems to me to be saying, though one must read between the lines to
get it, is that black people in America, because they lag so badly behind whites,
need a helping hand to raise them to a level at which they will feel that they are
well integrated into American society rather than feeling like members of a
disaffected underclass.
I am comfortable with that ground for affirmative action, remote as it is
from anything to do with Athenian democracy. Athens thrived on exclusion.
Most of the population consisted of women, slaves, and aliens, none of whom
had the rights of citizens; citizens comprised no more than twenty, and
perhaps as little as ten, percent of the adult population.43 I would not labor this
obvious point if Breyer had not sounded a Rousseauan note in the series of
rhetorical questions by which he seeks to tie O'Connor's analysis to active
liberty: "What are these arguments but an appeal to principles of solidarity, to
principles offraternity, to principles of active liberty?"' Solidarity and fraternity,
yes, and these were ideals of Athenian society as of the French Revolution, but
they are not, as he implies, democratic ideals. Nondemocratic societies have
frequently achieved high levels of solidarity.
Breyer turns next to statutory interpretation. He makes good arguments
against strict construction and in favor of using statutory language and other
clues to infer the statute's purpose and then using that purpose to guide
interpretation. But he overlooks the strongest argument against the purposive
approach: that it tends to override legislative compromises. (He also overlooks
the related possibility, emphasized in Cass Sunstein's review, of multiple
purposes that may conflict.4") The purpose of a statute may be clear enough,
but may have been blunted, as the bill made its way through the legislative mill
to enactment, in order to obtain majority support. If so, then using the purpose
to resolve ambiguities might give the supporters of the statute more than they
could have achieved in the legislative process. 46 And that would be
undemocratic.
42. Id. at 332; BREYER, supra note io, at 82 (quoting this passage).
43. For various estimates, see M. I. FINLEY, DEMOCRACY ANCIENT AND MODERN 51 (rev. ed.
1996); A. W. GOMME, THE POPULATION OF ATHENS IN THE FIFTH AND FOURTH CENTURIES
B.C. 26 tbl.i (1967); and MOGENS HERMAN HANSEN, THE ATHENIAN DEMOcRAY IN THE
AGE OF DEMOSTHENES 93-94 (JU.A Crook trans., 1991).
44. BREYER, supra note io, at 82.
45. Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719 (20o6).
46. RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 276-77 (1990).
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One begins to wonder whether Breyer's deepest commitment is to
democracy or to good policies. There is a possibly revealing slip when he says
that "an interpretation of a statute that tends to implement the legislator's will
helps to implement the public's will and is therefore consistent with the
Constitution's democratic purpose." 47 The slip is in referring to a singular
legislator, as distinct from the legislature. Legislation is passed by cobbling
together a majority of often fractious legislators representing different
interests. Compromise is inescapable and often blunts single-minded purpose.
The public is not a singularity either.
I am not suggesting that the purposive approach is wrong. Most of the
gaps in statutes are unintentional, and there is no way to fill them sensibly
without reflecting on what the statute seems to have been aimed at
accomplishing. But this is the counsel of good sense rather than anything to do
with the ideals of Athenian democracy-as is further shown by Breyer's
proposal that the best way to implement the purposive approach is to adopt the
"fiction" of the "reasonable legislator. ''1 8 The interpreter asks not what the
actual legislators thought, but what a "reasonable" legislator (again singular)
thought. It is the judge who decides what is "reasonable," for remember that
the reasonable legislator is a fiction. To suggest that this approach will
"translate the popular will into sound policy"49 is heroic even if one passes over
the uncertainties buried in the idea of the "popular will." The concept of the
reasonable legislator sounds more like a method of maximizing the judge's
discretion in statutory interpretation.
What is true and important is that legislators may be quite happy for
judges to impose "reasonable" interpretations on the legislative handiwork;
otherwise the legislators will have to spend a lot of time amending. The
"textualists" do legislatures no favor by insisting that statutes speak clearly; the
conditions of the legislative process, and in particular the need to compromise
in order to get statutes passed, makes it impossible for legislatures to
promulgate unambiguous statutes. Judges clean up after legislators, which is
fine, but it is an activity remote from anything to do with direct democracy.
What Breyer should have said is that loose construction may make
representative democracy work better.
47. BREYER, supra note io, at 99.
48. Id. at 97-101. Breyer is borrowing here from HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
49. BREYER, supra note io, at ioi.
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The concept of the reasonable legislator or "reasonable member of
Congress"50 recurs in Breyer's chapter on administrative law. The focus is on
Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,"' which held that
when a regulatory statute is ambiguous, the court should defer to the
regulatory agency's statutory interpretation, if reasonable. The theory is that in
such cases statutory interpretation, though a quintessentially judicial task, has
been delegated by Congress to the agency that enforces the statute, subject to
only light judicial review. Breyer proposes that to decide in a particular case
whether this delegation has occurred, the judge should "ask whether, given the
statutory aims and circumstances, a hypothetical member [i.e., a reasonable
member of Congress] would likely have wanted judicial deference in this
situation,"52 or, contrariwise, would have wanted to decide the question for
himself. I do not think that's the right question. By hypothesis, the statute is
ambiguous. Congress did not decide for itself, or, if it did, we don't know what
its decision was. The court will have to resort to "reasonable member"
interpretation. Realistically, the question is whether Congress should be taken
to have wanted the courts to resolve the ambiguity or the regulatory agency. I
don't know how to answer such a question.
Toward the end of the book Breyer discusses the objection, raised by
textualists such as his frequent sparring partner Justice Scalia, that the kind of
loose-construction approach that Breyer champions "open[s] the door to
subjectivity. "5 Well, it does, and the only good answer to Scalia is that
textualism or originalism proves in practice to be just as malleable as active
liberty. Against the charge of subjectivity Breyer argues mainly that "a judge
who emphasizes consequences, no less than any other, is aware of the legal
precedents, rules, standards, practices, and institutional understanding that a
decision will affect. "54 He offers only one example -of course, it is Brown v.
Board of Education, which overruled Plessy v. Ferguson. This singular example is
consistent with a reluctance to overrule constitutional decisions. But Breyer's
own practice as a Justice evinces no great reluctance to overrule; "[a]ware of'
does not mean "committed to." He joined Lawrence v. Texas,ss which overruled
Bowers v. Hardwick,56 and he joined Roper v. Simmons,57 which overruled
50. Id. at lO6.
51. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
52. BREYER, supra note io, at io6.
53. Id. at 118.
54. Id. at 118-19.
55. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
56. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Stanford v. Kentucky.'8 Lawrence and Roper, the first invalidating state statutes
that criminalize homosexual sodomy, the second invalidating state statutes that
authorize the execution of juvenile murderers, are notably bold "liberal"
decisions. Neither decision was based on a consideration of consequences. The
sodomy statutes struck down in Lawrence had virtually no consequences, since
by the time the case was decided the statutes were almost never enforced. They
had become little more than a statement of social disapproval of
homosexuality, and the Court substituted its own, more "enlightened" moral
view-which is fine with me, but not democratic. The psychological studies
offered in Roper to show that juveniles lack adequate moral maturity to
appreciate the significance of murdering someone were misunderstood by the
Court. 9 What the studies actually showed was that there is no inflection point
at age 18 at which murderers suddenly discover the moral significance of their
acts. The Justices overlooked an empirical literature concerning the incremental
deterrent effect of capital punishment.6"
Defending on consequentialist grounds his dissent in the school voucher
case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,61 Breyer said that he "saw in the
administration of huge grant programs for religious education the potential for
religious strife. ", 62 This is a conjecture; and it ignores the fact that, unless a
voucher program was permitted to go into effect, we would never be able to
verify or falsify the conjecture. We would never learn whether, for example, the
provision of additional money for private education (school voucher programs
cannot constitutionally be limited to religious schools -that much at least is
clear) would stimulate more secular competition for religious schools by
providing more money for secular private schools. It is now more than five
years since the Supreme Court upheld school vouchers, and there are no signs
of the religious strife that Breyer predicted.
Zelman is the answer to someone who might wish to defend Breyer's casual
attitude toward assessing consequences on the ground that speculation is the
best a judge can do. One thing the judge can do is allow social experiments to
be conducted so that measurable consequences can be observed. Another is to
deal responsibly with empirical evidence, as the Court failed to in Roper.
S7. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
S3. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
59. Posner, supra note 32, at 64-66.
6o. Id. at 64 n.io8 (citing this literature).
61. 536 U.S. 639, 717 (2002).
62. BREYER, supra note lo, at 121-22.
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To foreclose social experiments adopted by elected legislatures is not only
unpragmatic; it is undemocratic. It is true that Breyer votes more often than his
conservative colleagues to uphold federal statutes, but his democratic
credentials are placed in question by his joining such decisions as Lawrence and
Roper, in which the Court struck down state legislation, and by his dissent in
Zelman. He is also an enthusiastic citer of foreign constitutional decisions, and
that is a form of elitism, for decisions by foreign courts are not events in
American democracy. Even when the foreign nation is a democracy, its judges
are not appointed or confirmed by elected U.S. officials, as our federal judges
are, let alone elected by Americans, as most of our state judges are. And
speaking of popular democracy, I think it unlikely that Breyer believes that
judges should be elected or that he would support proposals for making it
easier to amend the Constitution or for allowing the recall of federal judges by
popular vote.
Breyer's methodology for deciding constitutional cases is thus not itself
notably democratic, and it is also fuzzy, but this does not trouble him
overmuch because he believes that "insistence upon clear rules can exact a high
constitutional price."61 He illustrates this contention with the question of
whether "three strikes and you're out" laws, which can result in a criminal
being sentenced to life even though his third crime was a minor one, such as a
theft of golf clubs or videotapes, can be adjudged cruel and unusual
punishment. 64 The Court thought not.6' Breyer dissented. He acknowledges in
his book that the position he advocated in his dissent "would leave the Court
without a clear rule." 6 6 And here we get close to the heart of Breyer's strength
(at times perhaps weakness) as a Justice. He is not a dogmatist, generating
rules from some high-level theory. He is in search of workable results. His
opinion in the sentencing guidelines case (Booker67) was a triumph of ingenuity
and political skill in forging a compromise that preserved a sentencing scheme
far superior to one that in the name of the Sixth Amendment would give
untrammeled sentencing discretion to trial judges whose knowledge of
penology is inferior to that of the Sentencing Commission.
But clear rules do have value, and vague standards have drawbacks. I am
thinking of Breyer's dissent in Eldred v. Ashcroft 68 The Court upheld the
63. BREYER, supra note io, at 128.
64. Id.
65. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
66. BREYER, supra note io, at 129.
67. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
68. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
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constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, which
extended the copyright term from life plus fifty years to life plus seventy years,
against a challenge that the extension violated the Constitution's Copyright
and Patent Clause, which authorizes Congress "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securingfor limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. ''69 What
concerns me is not the merit of the constitutional challenge but Breyer's
suggested standard: A statute extending a copyright term "lacks the
constitutionally necessary rational support (1) if the significant benefits that it
bestows are private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously to undermine the
expressive values that the Copyright Clause embodies; and (3) if it cannot find
justification in any significant Clause-related objective."7" This standard leaves
up in the air how a judge is to decide whether a copyright term is too long.
Although Breyer is the Justice most knowledgeable about intellectual
property in general and copyright in particular, his dissent in Eldred attracted
no support from his colleagues; Justice Stevens, the other dissenter, did not
join Breyer's dissent.7' Breyer has confessed his inability to persuade his
colleagues to his views about economic regulation,72 another field in which, like
intellectual property, he has greater expert knowledge than his colleagues. He
attributes his inability in part to his colleagues' preference for "bright-line
rules" in the law, which he thinks difficult to reconcile with economic
reasoning because "[e]conomics often concerns gradations, with consequences
that flow from a little more or a little less.... I tend to disfavor absolute legal
lines. Life is normally too complex for absolute rules."
s7
Justice Breyer is fluent in French. So perhaps he won't take offense if I call
him a bricoleur, defined by Wikipedia as "a person who creates things from
scratch, is creative and resourceful: a person who collects information and
things and then puts them together in a way that they were not originally
designed to do."'74 The "information and things" that Breyer has assembled to
construct an approach to constitutional and statutory interpretation includes
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
70. 537 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. 537 U.S. at 222 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Stephen Breyer, Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review, AEI-Brookings Joint Center
2003 Distinguished Lecture 2 (Dec. 4, 2004), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/
admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=84o. What is particularly notable about this essay, and very
welcome to me, is Breyer's contention that economic reasoning should play a larger, perhaps
a dominant, role in decisions involving economic regulation.
73- Id. at 6-7.
74. Bricolage, in Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bricolage (last visited Dec. 7, 2005).
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not only Athenian direct democracy and modern American pragmatism, but
also Ely's "representation-reinforcing" theory of constitutional adjudication,
75
Henry Hart's "reasonable legislator" theory of statutory interpretation, Ronald
Dworkin's theory (related to Hart's) that constitutional and statutory
provisions should be so interpreted as to make them the best possible
statements of political morality,76 economic analysis, and appropriate deference
to the conventional legal materials of precedent and statutory text.77 The
bricolage is as ingenious as it is complex, but the curious consequence of such
eclecticism is that it puts the judge in approximately the position he would
occupy if he had no constitutional theory. For couldn't Justice Breyer pull a
stick out of his bundle to justify any decision that he wanted to reach? It's not
as if the sticks have different weights; each is available to tip the balance in a
particular case. Breyer has articulated an approach that appears to be loose
enough to accommodate any result that a judge might want to reach for
reasons the judge might be unwilling to acknowledge publicly, such as a
visceral dislike for capital punishment, abortion, affirmative action, or religion.
But the book is so short (barely 40,000 words) and covers so much ground
that the possibility cannot be excluded that Breyer has in reserve, as it were,
effective responses to the criticisms I have made. Maybe the book is better
understood as a manifesto, intended to reach a larger audience than normally
attends works of constitutional theory, than as a work of patient scholarship
addressed to academic fusspots and nitpickers. The character of the book may
also reflect a tension between the way Breyer thinks and judges, on the one
hand, and the genre requirements of constitutional theory. He is not a top-
down theorist. Active liberty is not a new algorithm for generating "objective"
judicial decisions. It is not historically accurate. It is the name he has given to
his own, eclectic collection of policy preferences. Whether you agree with his
approach is likely to depend on whether you agree with those preferences. This
is not said in criticism. It is equally true of Breyer's antagonists, and of his and
their predecessors on the Supreme Court stretching back to John Marshall, or
for that matter to John Jay.
The idea that conservative Justices do not legislate from the bench is
rhetoric rather than reality. It is seductive rhetoric; it may have seduced Justice
Breyer, who insists that he doesn't legislate from the bench either, that he is the
better originalist because he grasps the democratic character of the
75. See ELY, supra note 15.
76. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION (1996); ELY, supra note 15.
77. Peter Berkowitz, Democratizing the Constitution, POL'Y REv., Dec. 2oo5/Jan. 2006, at 90
(reviewing BREYER, supra note io).
I-Yi Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
115:i699 20o6
JUSTICE BREYER THROWS DOWN THE GAUNTLET
Constitution. At this level, the debate between conservatives like Scalia and
liberals like Breyer is a semantic fog. Because of the vagueness of the
Constitution's key provisions and the strong emotions that constitutional cases
arouse (in part because of the large, well-nigh irreversible consequences of the
decisions in some of these cases), Justices are forced back on personal elements,
which include ideology as shaped by temperament, experience, and deep-
seated beliefs, in deciding how to vote. It has always been thus and always will
be. Lawyers will want to read Justice Breyer's engaging book not to find the
Holy Grail of constitutional and statutory interpretation but to learn about
Breyer's values, about what makes him tick as a Supreme Court Justice,
and about how therefore to craft arguments that will have a chance of
persuading him.
Judge Richard A. Posner sits on the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit and is Senior Lecturer at University of Chicago Law School. He
thanks Scott Hemphill, Dennis Hutchinson, Cass Sunstein, and Adrian Vermeule for
their very helpful comments on a previous draft, and Meghan Maloney for her
excellent research assistance.
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Justice Breyer's Democratic Pragmatism
The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes
that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many?- fated or
free? - material or spiritual? - here are notions either of which may or may
not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The
pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its
respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to
any one if this notion rather than that notion were true?'
A Concise Statement of the Task
In interpreting a statute a court should:
Decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and to any
subordinate provision of it which may be involved; ....
It should assume, unless the contrary unmistakably appears, that the
legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably.2
I. PRAGMATISM, CONSEQUENCES, AND ACTIVE LIBERTY
As a law professor at Harvard Law School, Stephen Breyer specialized in
administrative law. His important work in that field was marked above all by
its unmistakably pragmatic foundations.3 In an influential book, Breyer
emphasized that regulatory problems were "mismatched" to regulatory tools;
1. WILLIAM JAMES, What Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM 43,45 (1907).
2. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374, 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) (outline formatting omitted).
3. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
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he urged that an understanding of the particular problem that justified
regulation would help in the selection of the right tool. 4 One of Breyer's major
innovations lay in an insistence on evaluating traditional doctrines not in a
vacuum, but in light of the concrete effects of regulation on the real world.'
Hence Breyer argued for a close connection between administrative law and
regulatory policy. 6 Continuing his pragmatic orientation, he also emphasized
the importance of better priority-setting in regulation -of finding mechanisms
to ensure that resources are devoted to large problems rather than small ones.7
While some of Breyer's work touched on the separation of powers,'
constitutional law was not his field. But as a member of the Supreme Court,
Breyer has slowly been developing a distinctive approach of his own, one that
also has a pragmatic dimension, and that can be seen as directly responsive to
his colleague, Justice Antonin Scalia, and to Scalia's embrace of "originalism":
the view that the Constitution should be interpreted to mean what it originally
meant.9
A. Three Claims
This book announces and develops Breyer's theory. Its most distinctive
feature is its effort to connect three seemingly disparate claims. The first is an
insistence that judicial review can and should be undertaken with close
reference to active liberty and to democratic goals, a point with clear links to
the work of John Hart Ely.' The second is an emphasis on the centrality of
"purposes" to legal interpretation, a point rooted in the great legal process
materials of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks and, in particular, their brilliant note
on statutory interpretation.1' The third is a claim about the need to evaluate
theories of legal interpretation with close reference to their consequences, a
4. See id. at 191.
S. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TowARD EFFECrIVE RISK
REGULATION (1993); BREYER, supra note 3.
6. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY (5th ed.
2002). Full disclosure: I am among the "a!." now working on the book, and hence Breyer
and I are, in a formal sense, coauthors. But Breyer, otherwise occupied, has not worked on
the book since I have joined it.
7. See BREYER, supra note 5, at io-ii.
8. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785 (1984).
g. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57U. CIN. L. REv. 849 (1989).
10. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (198o).
ii. See HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1374-8o.
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point whose foundations can be found in American pragmatism. In Breyer's
view, any theory of interpretation must be assessed by taking close account of
its actual effects.
Much of the interest and originality of Breyer's book lies in its brisk but
ambitious effort to integrate these three claims. In my view, Breyer is right to
see a connection between self-government and constitutional interpretation,
and also to emphasize that a theory of interpretation must be attentive to its
consequences. No such theory can be evaluated or defended without reference
to its effects. In addition, Breyer argues convincingly for an approach to
constitutional law that generally respects democratic prerogatives and also
embodies a form of modesty, in the form of narrow rulings on the most
difficult questions. But I shall raise two sets of questions about his analysis.
The first set involves the difficulties of purposivism. Those who emphasize
active liberty and democratic self-government might well reject Breyer's
purposive approach to interpretation, including Breyer's purposive reading of
the Constitution. They might embrace textualism on the ground that text
represents the best evidence of the public's will; they might prefer canons of
construction; they might even embrace the view, associated with James Bradley
Thayer, that courts should uphold legislation unless it is clearly beyond
constitutional bounds." The second set of questions involves the possibility
that consequentialism, properly understood, might lead in directions that
Breyer rejects. Those who believe in the importance of consequences might
well be drawn to an approach very different from Breyer's. If consequences
matter, textualism and Thayerism are not off the table.
Breyer's specific conclusions are unfailingly reasonable; the question is
whether his general commitments are enough to justify those conclusions. I
shall suggest that they are not. Breyer is correct to reject originalism in
constitutional law, and in that domain his own approach, embracing both
minimalism and restraint, has a great deal to offer. But it must be developed in
a way that devotes more care to the problem of judicial fallibility, and I shall
offer some notes on how the theory might be so developed. In the end, I
suggest that while purposivism has its uses, Breyer underrates the arguments
for starting with the text, and undervalues the role of canons of construction in
statutory interpretation.
12. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7
HA.v. L. REV. 129 (1893)
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B. Theory and Practice
Breyer's organizing theme is "active liberty," which he associates with the
right of self-governance. It is noteworthy that in his own judicial work, Breyer
is plausibly seen as the most consistently democratic member of the Rehnquist
Court: Among its nine members, he had the highest percentage of votes to
uphold acts of Congress" and also to defer to the decisions of the executive
branch.' 4 And indeed, a great deal of his book is a plea for judicial caution and
deference.' s But Breyer does not mean to say that courts should uphold
legislation whenever the Constitution is unclear. 6 Like Ely, Breyer does not
rule out the view that courts should take an aggressive role in some areas,
above all in order to protect democratic governance.
17
His short book comes in three parts. The first builds on Benjamin
Constant's famous distinction between the liberty of the ancients and the
liberty of the moderns 8 The liberty of the ancients involves "active liberty" -
the right to share in the exercise of sovereign power. Quoting Constant, Breyer
refers to the hope that the sharing of that power would "ennoble[]" the
people's "thoughts [and] establish[] among them a kind of intellectual equality
which forms the glory and the power of a people."1 9 But Constant also prized
negative liberty, meaning individual "independence" from government
authority."0 As Breyer describes Constant's view, which he firmly endorses, it is
necessary to have both forms of freedom, and thus "to combine the two
together. " "
Breyer believes that the Framers of the Constitution did exactly that. His
special emphasis is on what Constant called "an active and constant
13. Lori A. Ringhand, Judicial Activism and the Rehnquist Court (Sept. 7, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.cof/abstract=765445.
14. See Cass R Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of
Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. (forthcoming 20o6).
is. Thus, for example, Breyer favors a deferential approach to campaign finance restrictions and
affirmative action programs. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR
DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 48-49, 82-83 (2005). He also makes a plea for judicial caution
in the domain of privacy. Id. at 66-74.
16. This position is defended in Thayer, supra note 12.
17. BREYER, supra note 15, at 11-12.
18. Id. at 3-7. The best discussion remains STEPHEN HOLMES, BENJAMIN CONSTANT AND THE
MAKING OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1984).
19. BREYER, supra note 15, at 4.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id. at 5. It is not clear that this is, in fact, an adequate account of Constant's view.
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participation in public power."' That form of participation includes voting,
town meetings, and the like; but it also requires that citizens receive
information and education to develop their capacity for effective self-
governance. In Breyer's view, the citizens of post-Revolutionary America
insisted on highly democratic forms of state government, promoting popular
control. Breyer is aware of the highly ambivalent experiences of post-
Revolutionary governments; he knows that some commentators have rejected
the view that the Constitution is a democratic document.23 Nonetheless, he
believes that the Framers of the Constitution accepted the deepest aspirations
of the American Revolution, creating a framework with a basically "democratic
objective."'
In Breyer's account, the Warren Court appreciated active liberty and it
attempted to make that form of liberty more real for all Americans.2" By
contrast, the Rehnquist Court may have pushed the pendulum "too far" back
in the other direction.26 In short, Breyer believes that an appreciation of active
liberty has concrete implications for a wide range of modern disputes.
The second part of his book traces those implications. He begins with free
speech. An obvious question is whether the Court should be hostile or
receptive to campaign finance reform. With his eye directly on the democratic
ball, Breyer suggests that if we focus on the "the Constitution's general
democratic objective . . . 'participatory self-government,"' 27 then we will be
receptive to restrictions on campaign contributions. A central reason is that
such restrictions "seek to democratize the influence that money can bring to
bear upon the electoral process."s In the same vein, Breyer insists that the free
speech principle, seen in terms of active liberty, gives special protection to
political speech, and significantly less protection to commercial advertising. He
criticizes his colleagues on the Court for protecting advertising with the
aggressiveness that they have shown in recent years. His purposive
22. Id. at 4; see also Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with
Ratinoality Review, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487 (1979) (discussing the ideal of active liberty,
in the form of engagement in public affairs).
23. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1913).
24. BREYER, supra note 1S, at 9.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 46.
as. Id. at 47.
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interpretation of freedom of speech thus emphasizes democratic self-
government above all.29
Affirmative action might seem to have little to do with active liberty. At
first glance, it poses a conflict between the ideal of color-blindness and what
Breyer calls a "'narrowly purposive"'30 understanding of the Equal Protection
Clause, one that emphasizes the historical mistreatment of African-Americans.
Direcdy disagreeing with some of his colleagues, 3  Breyer endorses the
narrowly purposive approach. But he also contends that in permitting
affirmative action at educational institutions, the Court has been centrally
concerned with democratic self-government. The reason, pragmatic in
character, is that "some form of affirmative action" is "necessary to maintain a
well-functioning participatory democracy."32 Breyer points to the Court's
emphasis on the role of broad access to education in "'sustaining our political
and cultural heritage"' and in promoting diverse leadership.3 In Breyer's view,
it should be no surprise that the Court selected an interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause that would, as a pragmatic matter, promote rather than
undermine the operation of democracy. In short, a serious problem with the
attack on affirmative action is that it would produce intolerable consequences.
With respect to privacy, Breyer's emphasis is on the novelty of new
technologies and the rise of unanticipated questions about how to balance law
enforcement needs against the interest in keeping personal information private.
Because of the difficulty of those problems, Breyer argues, on pragmatic
grounds, for "a special degree of judicial modesty and caution."14 Hence his
plea is for narrow, cautious judicial rulings that do not lay out long-term
solutions. In Breyer's view, such rulings serve active liberty, because a narrow
ruling is unlikely to "interfere with any ongoing democratic policy debate."
3
1
His argument here is important because other members of the Court, most
notably Scalia, have objected to narrow rulings on the ground that they leave
too much uncertainty for the future.3
6
29. In this way he seems to follow ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (photo. reprint 2000) (1948). CAss R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993), is in the same general vein.
3o. BREYER, supra note 15, at 8o.
31. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 3o6, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
32. BREYER, supra note 15, at 82.
33- Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31).
34. Id. at 71.
35. Id. at 73.
36. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
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Some of the most noteworthy decisions of the Rehnquist Court attempted
to limit the power of Congress. 7 For example, the Court struck down the
Violence Against Women Act as beyond congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause.' 8 It also announced an "anti-commandeering" principle,
one that forbids the national government from requiring state legislatures to
enact laws.39 In the abstract, those decisions seem to promote active liberty,
because they decrease the authority of the more remote national government,
and because they promote participation and self-government at the local level.
Breyer is no critic of federalism or defender of centralized government.
Nonetheless, he strongly objects to the Court's recent federalism decisions.
Breyer's special target is the anti-commandeering principle. Speaking in
heavily pragmatic terms, Breyer thinks that this prohibition prevents valuable
national initiatives to protect against terrorism, environmental degradation,
and natural disasters -initiatives in which, for example, the national
government requires state officials to ensure compliance with federal
standards.4"
Breyer also contends that an understanding of active liberty can inform
more technical debates. In Chevron U.SA., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,4" for example, the Court announced a principle of deference to
administrative interpretations of law. The Court ruled that in the face of
statutory ambiguity, courts should defer to agency interpretations so long as
they are reasonable. Breyer believes that this approach is too simple and too
crude, in a way that disserves democracy itself.42 When the agency has solved
an interstitial question, Breyer believes that judicial deference is appropriate,
because deference is what a reasonable legislature would want. But on
"question[s] of national importance," 43 involving the fundamental reach or
nature of the statute, Breyer thinks that a reasonable legislature would not
want courts to accept the agency's interpretation. He thus urges that courts
should take a firmer hand in reviewing agency judgments on fundamental
matters than in reviewing more routine matters. Here too he opposes Justice
37. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
38. Id.
3g. NewYorkv. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
4o. BREYER, supra note 15, at 59-61.
41. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
42. See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363
(1986); see also Cass R Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
43. BREYER, supra note 15, at 107.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Scalia, who endorses a broad reading of Chevron, one that would generally
defer to agency interpretations of law.44
There is a larger interpretive question in the background. Should courts
rely only on a statute's literal text, or should they place an emphasis instead on
statutory purpose and congressional intent? Sharply disagreeing with the more
textually oriented Scalia, 45 and again emphasizing pragmatic considerations,
Breyer favors purpose and intent. Here he is evidently influenced by the
famous legal process materials, compiled by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. As I
have noted, those materials place "purpose" front and center, and they also
insist that courts should assume that legislators are "reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."46 In the same vein, Breyer
emphasizes that a purposive approach asks courts to consider the goals of "the
'reasonable Member of Congress'- a legal fiction that applies, for example,
even when Congress did not in fact consider a particular problem."47
In defending this approach, Breyer speaks in thoroughly pragmatic terms,
emphasizing the beneficial consequences of purposivism. Breyer thinks that, as
compared with a single-minded focus on literal text, his approach will tend to
make the law more sensible, almost by definition. He also contends that it
"helps to implement the public's will and is therefore consistent with the
Constitution's democratic purpose."4 Breyer concludes that an emphasis on
legislative purpose "means that laws will work better for the people they are
presently meant to affect. Law is tied to life, and a failure to understand how a
statute is so tied can undermine the very human activity that the law seeks to
benefit."49 Thus, Breyer directly links active liberty, purposive approaches to
law, and an emphasis on consequences.
The third part of Breyer's book tackles the broadest questions of
interpretive theory and directly engages Scalia's contrary view. Breyer
emphasizes that he means to draw attention to purposes and consequences
above all. Constitutional provisions, he thinks, have "certain basic purposes,"50
and they should be understood in light of those purposes and the broader
democratic goals that infuse the Constitution as a whole. In addition,
44. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 239 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511.
45. See SCALIA, supra note 9.
46. See HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1378.
47. BREYER, supra note iS, at 88. See the powerful note emphasizing this point and what the
authors saw as the centrality of purpose, in HART & SACKS, supra note 2, at 1374-8o.
48. BREYER, supra note 15, at 99.
49. Id. at ioo.
5o. Id. at 115.
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consequences are "an important yardstick to measure a given interpretation's
faithfulness to these democratic purposes."'" Breyer is fully aware that many
people, including his colleagues Scalia and Thomas, are drawn to "textualism"
and its close cousin "originalism" -approaches that favor close attention to the
meaning of legal terms at the time they were enacted. Scalia, Thomas, and their
followers are likely to think that Breyer's approach is an invitation for open-
ended judicial lawmaking in a way that compromises his own democratic
aspirations. s2 But he offers several responses.
First, originalist judges claim to follow history, but they cannot easily
demonstrate that history in fact favors their preferred method. The
Constitution does not say that it should be interpreted to mean what it meant
when it was ratified. The document itself enshrines no particular theory of
interpretation; it does not mandate originalism. And if originalism cannot be
defended by reference to the intentions and understandings of the Framers,
Breyer asks, in what way can it be defended-"other than in an appeal to
consequences?"3 He points out that the most sophisticated originalists
ultimately argue that their approach will have good consequences -by, for
example, stabilizing the law and deterring judges from imposing their own
views. Even Breyer's originalist adversaries are "consequentialist in this
important sense." 4 They are not consequentialists in particular cases, but they
adopt, and defend, their preferred approach on consequentialist grounds."5
Breyer's second argument is that his own approach does not leave courts at
sea, for he, too, insists that judges must take account of "the legal precedents,
rules, standards, practices, and institutional understanding that a decision will
affect." 6 Those who focus on consequences will not favor frequent or dramatic
legal change, simply because stability is important. In any case, textualism and
originalism cannot avoid the problem of judicial discretion. "Which historical
account shall we use? Which tradition shall we apply?""' In the end, Breyer
51. Id.
52. See SCALIA, supra note 9.
53. BREYER, supra note 15, at 118.
S4. Id.
55. See id; see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (2004); Posting of
Randy Barnett to Legal Affairs Debate Club, http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/
debateclub-cieo5o5.msp#Tuesday (May 3, 2005, 13:43 EST) ("Given a sufficiently good
constitutional text, originalists maintain that better results will be reached overall if
government officials - including judges - must stick to the original meaning rather than
empowering them to trump that meaning with one that they prefer.").
s6. BREYER, supra note i5, at 118-19.
57. Id. at 127.
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contends that the real problem with textualism and originalism is that they
"may themselves produce seriously harmful consequences-outweighing
whatever risks of subjectivity or uncertainty are inherent in other
approaches.',,8 His pragmatic goal is to "help Americans remain true to the past
while better resolving their contemporary problems of government through
law," 9 and he believes that his kind of purposive approach, rooted in active
liberty, is most likely to promote that goal.
II. DEMOCRACY AND INTERPRETATION
This is a brisk, lucid, and energetic book, written with conviction and
offering a central argument that is at once provocative and appealing. It is
unusual for a member of the Supreme Court to attempt to set out a general
approach to his job; Breyer's effort must be ranked among the most impressive
such efforts in the nation's long history. His attack on originalism is powerful
and convincing. And in defending a pragmatic, purposive-oriented alternative,
Breyer writes in a way that is unfailingly civil and generous to those who
disagree with him, providing a model for how respectful argument might
occur, even in a domain that is intensely polarized.
But there are two general problems with his approach. The first stems from
the difficulty of characterizing purposes. Texts rarely announce their own
purposes; the same is true of the Constitution itself. When Breyer asks judges
to identify the purposes of reasonable legislators, he is inviting a degree of
judicial discretion in the judgment of what purposes are reasonable. The
second problem involves consequences, viewed through the lens of active
liberty. It is possible both to use active liberty as the basis for evaluating
consequences and to think that courts do best if they follow the ordinary
meaning of statutory texts, or defer to agency interpretations on the most
important questions, or uphold legislation unless it is plainly unconstitutional.
Many different approaches, not only Breyer's, can march under the pragmatic
banner.6"
Breyer's own approach requires supplemental assumptions, involving not
only active liberty but a degree of confidence in judicial capacities, and
therefore a willingness to use standards rather than rules in the domain of
s8. Id. at 129.
59. Id. at 11.
6o. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY (forthcoming 2006)
(manuscript at 254, on file with author) (defending a form of Thayerism on pragmatic
grounds); Scalia, supra note 9 (making pragmatic arguments on behalf of originalism).
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judicial interpretation.6 I believe that in constitutional law, Breyer often points
in the right directions. He does so by emphasizing the value of judicial
deference to democratic judgments ;6' by showing some enthusiasm for judicial
minimalism, in the form of narrow decisions that leave the hardest questions
undecided;6 and by suggesting that a stronger judicial role is most defensible
when democratic processes are functioning poorly. 64 For statutes, however, an
emphasis on text, rather than purpose, is the right place to start; Breyer gives
too little attention to the strongest arguments for textualism. In addition, the
best theory of statutory interpretation would give less attention to purpose and
more attention to applicable canons of construction, including those canons
that counsel avoidance of constitutional questions and deference to the views of
administrative agencies.
A. Originalism and Consequences
Breyer's most general claim is that any approach to legal interpretation
must be defended in a way that pays close attention to its consequences.
Despite its simplicity, this pragmatic point continues to be widely ignored. It
has particular implications for the analysis of originalism. One of the strengths
of Breyer's book is his brief but powerful criticism of that approach to
constitutional law.
There is a lively historical dispute about whether those who ratified the
Constitution meant to hold posterity to their specific views.6 5 If the ratifiers did
not want to bind posterity to their particular understandings, originalism
stands defeated on its own premises: The original understanding may have
been that the original understanding is not binding. Breyer properly notes this
possibility. 66 But suppose that the ratifiers had no clear view on that question,
or even that the better understanding is that they did, in fact, want to hold
61. In fact, many of the disagreements between Breyer and Scalia involve a debate over
standards versus rules, with Breyer typically opting for standards and Scalia for rules. See,
e.g., Sunstein, supra note 42.
6z. See, for example, Breyer's treatment of commercial advertising, BREYER, supra note 15, at 50-
55.
63. See id. at 66-74.
64. See id. at 11.
65. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519
(2003); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV.
885 (1985).
66. B.EYER, supra note 15, at 117.
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posterity to their understandings.6 7 Even if so, it is up to us, and not to them,
to decide whether to follow those views. It would be circular and therefore
unhelpful to defend reliance on the ratifiers' specific views on the ground that
the ratifiers wanted us to respect their specific views.
Breyer is therefore right to suggest that originalism requires some
justification in nonhistorical terms; and consequences are surely relevant to any
such effort at justification.68 Suppose that the consequence of originalism
would be to threaten many contemporary rights and understandings. If so,
why should we accept it?69 Originalism would authorize states to discriminate
on the basis of sex, which the Equal Protection Clause was not originally
understood to forbid. Originalism might well mean that Brown v. Board of
Education was wrongly decided;70 it would probably mean that the national
government could discriminate on the basis of race and sex, because the Equal
Protection Clause applies only to the states. Many originalists firmly believe
that their approach would require courts to invalidate a great deal of
legislation-by, for example, striking down independent regulatory agencies,
71
forbidding Congress to delegate broad discretion to regulatory agencies,72 and
imposing new limitations on national power under the Commerce Clause. 3
67. See Nelson, supra note 65.
68. Of course any evaluation of consequences must be value-laden, a point taken up below. See
infra Section II.C.
69. See generally Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990)
(discussing originalism).
70. The reason is that it is not easy to find, in the Fourteenth Amendment, a specific
understanding that any relevant clause banned segregation. See John P. Frank & Robert F.
Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 1972 WASH. U. L.QO.421,
460-62 (discussing the variety of views of segregation in the Reconstruction era); see also
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 123-25 (1977) (noting support for segregation among framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-56 (1955). For a counterargument, see Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). McConnell
impressively shows that many members of Congress believed that under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress had the authority to abolish segregation. But it is one
thing to say that many members of Congress so believed, but never enacted legislation to
that effect; it is quite another thing to say that the Fourteenth Amendment was understood
to create a self-executing, judicially enforceable ban on segregation.
71. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994).
72. See, e.g., Randolph J. May, The Public Interest Standard: Is It Too Indeterminate To Be
Constitutional?, 53 FED. CoMM. L.J. 427 (2001).
73. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2229 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESERVATION OF LIBERTY 274-318
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Originalism would likely eliminate the right of privacy altogether, simply
because there is no such right in the document, and it is hard to show that the
original understanding of any relevant provision supports the privacy right.
I do not insist that the originalist method necessarily compels all of these
conclusions. And even if originalism does have these consequences, some
originalists candidly acknowledge that established precedent has its claims, and
that it must sometimes be respected even if it deviates from the original
understanding. Justice Scalia, for example, says that he might well be a "faint-
hearted" originalist74 because he is willing to follow precedent even when he
believes that it is wrong in principle.7" My only point is that Breyer is entirely
correct to note that the document itself does not require originalism, to argue
that consequences matter to the choice of a theory of interpretation, and to
insist that if we care about consequences, the argument for originalism does
not look very plausible."6
B. Second-Order Pragmatism? Purposes and Fallible Judges
Breyer generally favors purposive approaches to legal texts. But he says too
little about the difficulties that judges face in describing purposes. We can
describe this as a pragmatic objection to his approach-an objection that might
argue in favor of second-order pragmatism, that is, a form of pragmatism that
rejects an inquiry into purpose, or any case-by-case approach, because it is alert
to judicial fallibility. 7 If the inquiry into purposes produces indeterminacy,
bias, or error, the argument for purposivism is undermined. Gertrude Stein's
famous complaint about Oakland-"there is no there there"r7 - may also be
true of legislative purposes. Let us begin with some technical issues.
(2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1987); Douglas H. Ginsburg, On Constitutionalism, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 7.
74. Scalia, supra note 9, at 864.
75. Scalia has been quoted as saying that Thomas "'does not believe in stare decisis, period.'"
Scalia explained, "'If a constitutional line of authority is wrong, [Thomas] would say let's
get it right. I wouldn't do that.'" See KEN FosKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF CLARENCE THOMAS 281-82 (2004).
76. There are other problems, including the arguable incoherence of the originalist enterprise.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE
WRONG FOR AMERICA 68-71 (2005).
77. Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MJCH. L. REv. 885,
886 (2003).
78. GERTRUIDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 239 (1937), available at http://www.
bartleby.com/73/148.html.
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Recall that Breyer argues against a broad reading of Chevron; he believes
that for major questions courts should make an independent assessment of
statutory meaning, and not defer to reasonable interpretations by the executive
branch. But why? His answer appears to be that reasonable legislators would
want courts to assume an independent role. 79 But is this so clear? Assume that
a statute-say, the Endangered Species Act, or the Food and Drug Act-contains
an ambiguous provision on an issue of national importance. Might not
reasonable legislators want a specialized, accountable agency to resolve the
ambiguity, even on major questions? Resolution of statutory ambiguities often
calls for a difficult policy judgment, and reasonable legislatures might not want
difficult policy judgments to be made by federal courts. °
On consequentialist grounds, consider the following fact: In reviewing
agency interpretations of law, Republican appointees to the federal bench show
a definite tilt in a conservative direction, and Democratic appointees show a
definite tilt in a liberal direction."' Is it so clear that a reasonable legislator
would want statutory ambiguities to be resolved in accordance with whatever
tilt can be found on the relevant reviewing court? Or consider an additional
fact: A more refined approach to Chevron, of the sort that Breyer celebrates, has
produced a great deal of confusion in the lower courts.8' Does pragmatism
support that outcome?
In short, it is not clear that in this context Breyer has properly identified the
(hypothetical, constructed) instructions of a reasonable legislator. But the
important point is far more general. In interpreting statutes, Breyer follows
Hart and Sacks in arguing in favor of close attention to purposes, understood
as the objectives of a "reasonable legislator." Sometimes this approach is indeed
useful, especially when there is a consensus on what reasonableness requires."
But Hart and Sacks, writing in the complacent, consensus-pervaded legal
culture of the 1950s, downplayed the possibility that disagreement, highly
ideological in nature, would break out on that question. After the 196os, when
the ideological disagreements became omnipresent in the legal culture, the
purposive approach favored by Hart and Sacks came under severe pressure. In
79. BREYER, supra note 15, at 1O6.
go. This argument is spelled out in some detail in Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The
Executive's Power To Interpret the Law, ii5 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 20o6).
8i. See id.; Sunstein, supra note 14.
82. See Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 347 (2003);
Lisa Schultze Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND.
L. REv. 1443 (2006).
83. Examples are given in Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845, 848-61 (1992).
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my view, the appeal of textualism is best understood as a product of the post-
1960s awareness that the search for purposes is often driven by value
judgments of one or another kind, and a belief that those judgments ought not
to be made by unelected judges. 
4
In the current period, it should be obvious that different judges may well
disagree about what a reasonable legislator would like to do. Imagine that a law
condemns "discrimination on the basis of sex," and suppose that a state adopts
a height and weight requirement for police officers, one that excludes far more
women than men. In deciding whether this requirement is "discrimination,"
how shall judges characterize the purpose of a reasonable legislator? It is
inevitable that courts will see their own preferred view as reasonable. Does that
promote active liberty? Does pragmatism support a situation in which judges
assess reasonableness by their own lights?
Unfortunately, the problem is common. Suppose that a statute imposes
special punishment on those who "carry" a firearm in relation to a drug
offense; does someone "carry" a firearm when he drives a car with a firearm in
the glove compartment? Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer said "yes,"
emphasizing what he saw as the legislature's reasonable purpose -which, in his
view, would make it senseless to distinguish between a firearm "carried" in a
car and a firearm "carried" by hand in a bag."s But perhaps the legislature's
reasonable purpose was to punish the unique dangers that come from a
situation in which a firearm is "carried" (literally?) on the person. If so, a
purposive definition of "carry" would not include transportation via
automobile.
The general points are that laws rarely come with clear announcements of
their purposes and that in hard cases any characterization requires some kind
of evaluative judgment from courts. In such cases, purposive interpretation is
not a matter of finding something; there is no "there" to find there. Suppose
that an antidiscrimination statute is invoked against affirmative action
programs.8 6 Does the purpose of the ban on "discrimination" argue for, or
against, such programs? It would be easy to characterize the purpose as the
elimination of any consideration of race from the relevant domain; it would
also be easy to characterize the purpose as the protection of traditionally
disadvantaged groups."s If judges are asked to say what "reasonable" legislators
84. See SCALIA, supra note 9, at 16-18.
85. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132-33 (1998).
86. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
87. See RONALD DWORKIN, How To Read the Civil Rights Act, in A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 316
(1985).
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would like to do, they are all too likely to say what they themselves would like
to do.
Hart and Sacks, Breyer's predecessors, offer a powerful and largely sensible
approach to statutory interpretation, but they devote too little attention to the
problem of characterizing purpose. When courts choose one purpose over
another (reasonable) candidate, they are actually attempting to put the relevant
text in the best constructive light.88 Of course they are selecting an
interpretation that fits the text and context; if they were not doing that, they
would not be engaging in interpretation at all. But when they select a
reasonable purpose, they are choosing an approach that, by their own lights,
makes the best sense. A judicial judgment on this count is hardly untethered-
that would be a caricature - but it is a judicial judgment nonetheless.
Many textualists distrust the resort to purposes for this very reason. They
want courts to hew closely to statutory language8 9 They think that judges have
used common law approaches, including analogical reasoning, in domains
where they do not belong. 90 And, indeed, the Hart and Sacks materials might
well be understood as a product of an early confrontation between common
law thinking and a system of law that is pervaded by statutory interventions. It
is also possible to argue that an emphasis on the plain meaning of the text-
which is what, after all, has been enacted -promotes democratic responsibility
and also disciplines the judiciary by reducing the risk that judges will infuse
texts with purposes of their own.
If purpose is being characterized in a way that defies the ordinary meaning
of the text, these arguments for textualism have considerable pragmatic force.
Indeed, textualism might easily be defended with reference to active liberty,
and in two different ways. First, textualism promotes democratic government,
by encouraging the legislature to make its instructions clear. Over time, a text-
oriented judiciary might even promote more clarity and better accountability
from legislatures, simply because legislators will know that text will be what
matters. Second, textualism constrains judicial creation of "intentions" and
"purposes" to push statutes in judicially preferred directions. 9' Suppose that
88. See RONALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 229 (1986).
89. See SCALIA, supra note 9, at 23-25.
go. Id. at 3-9.
91. Note in this regard the very different reaction of German and Italian judges to the
emergence of fascism. German judges proceeded in a purposive fashion, abandoning text in
favor of legislative goals (and consequences!), in a way that promoted injustice and even
atrocity. See INGO MOLLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 8o-81
(Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991). By contrast, the Italian judges paid close attention
to text and to plain meaning in a way that produced much better consequences. See Guido
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when judges identify intentions or purposes, they are sometimes making their
own evaluative judgments, and not following legislative will. If so, those
concerned with active liberty, seeking to minimize the discretion of unelected
judges, might want courts to follow text and to minimize the role of intentions
and purposes.
To be sure, it is easy to overstate the constraints imposed by text, and this
is a strong point for Breyer. When the text is ambiguous, or leaves gaps,
textualism by hypothesis is inadequate, and some other interpretive tool must
be invoked.92 There is a serious risk that in hard cases, preferences are likely to
matter for textualists as for everyone else.93 My only suggestion is that Breyer
pays too little attention to the risk that any judgments about reasonableness
will be the judges' own, in a way that disserves democracy itself.
Breyer is correct to say that any theory of interpretation has to be defended
in terms of its consequences. But for interpreting statutes, it is not at all clear
that a purposive approach, focusing on consequences in particular cases, is
preferable to a text-based approach, one that asks judges to think little or not at
all about consequences. A textual approach might be simpler to apply; if so,
that is surely a point in its favor. And if judges cannot reliably identify
reasonable purposes, textualism might also lead to better results, or
consequences, all things considered.94 Much depends on the capacities of
judges; much also depends on whether the legislature would behave
differently, and better, if a textualist approach is followed. 9
None of this means that Scalia's approach is necessarily superior to
Breyer's. But it does point out the necessity of engaging the possibility that on
his own consequentialist grounds, and with an eye firmly on democratic goals,
Calabresi, Two Functions of Formalism, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 479, 482 (2000) ("To the scholars
opposing Fascism, the nineteenth-century self-contained formalistic system became a great
weapon.... What it conserved was the liberal, nineteenth-century political approach...
[and] in a time of Fascism, the important thing was that it conserved basic democratic
attitudes.").
92. Consider, for example, the rule of lenity, invoked in Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
93. Evidence can be found in Sunstein, supra note 80; and Sunstein, supra note 14.
g4. Some people appear to believe that interpretation, to count as such, necessarily calls for
attention to the intent of those who wrote the text in question. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, There
Is No Textualist Position, 42 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 629, 630-32 (2005). This is a blunder. In law,
it is certainly possible to interpret texts by pointing to the ordinary meaning of the words,
without speculating about authorial intentions. Whether this is desirable as well as possible
is another question, one that must be resolved by reference, among other things, to
consequences.
9. See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 636
(1999).
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textualism in the interpretation of ordinary statutes might be preferable to an
approach that explores purposes.9 6 To be sure, textualism is sometimes a fake,
as when the text does not have any clear meaning. In my view, hard cases, in
which the text is indeterminate, are best resolved with clear reference to the
views of any applicable administrative agency and also with close attention to
pertinent canons of construction. Breyer spends far too little time on such
canons, 97 which play a pervasive role in statutory interpretation, even when
they are not explicitly identified. Any court will inevitably interpret statutes
against background understandings, some but not all of which will be reduced
to canons. Properly used, such canons discipline the exercise of judicial
discretion and also serve the system of separated powers. 9s
A simple example is the idea that statutes will not lightly be taken to raise
serious constitutional problems. This canon serves to ensure that the
legislature, and not merely the executive, will authorize intrusions on
constitutionally sensitive interests99 - an important idea that has nothing to do
with legislative purposes. As another example, consider the notion that unless
Congress has spoken with clarity, agencies are not allowed to apply statutes
retroactively, even if the relevant terms are quite unclear.100 Because
retroactivity is disfavored in the law,"' statutes will be construed to apply
prospectively unless Congress has specifically said otherwise. Or consider the
presumption against applying statutes outside of the territory of the United
States." 2 If statutes are to receive extraterritorial application, it must be as a
result of a deliberate congressional judgment to this effect. Canons of this
general sort, implicit or explicit, play an important role in statutory
interpretation, and they often discipline judicial judgment, more so than does
resort to a judicially constructed purpose.
But this is not the place to defend a particular approach to statutory
interpretation. The only point is that Breyer has not shown that a purposive
approach is unambiguously preferable to the reasonable alternatives.
96. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 74 (2000).
97. BREYER, supra note 15, at 98-99.
98. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315 (200o).
99. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 8o.
ioo. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
101. Id.
102. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
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C. Active Liberty as an Interpretive Tool
Breyer is right to say that the Framers wanted to recognize both active
liberty and negative liberty. But the Framers saw themselves as republicans,
not as democrats, 03 and they did not believe in participatory democracy or in
rule through town meetings. On this count, Breyer slides quickly over intense
debates about what the American Framers actually sought to do.1 °4 Of course,
they attempted to provide a framework for a form of self-government.-' But so
stated, that goal operates at an exceedingly high level of abstraction, one that
cannot easily be brought to bear on concrete cases. Much of the time, it is hard
to link the general idea of self-government to particular judgments about
contemporary disputes in constitutional law.
Certainly Breyer does not try to argue, in originalist fashion, that the actual
drafters and ratifiers of the relevant constitutional provisions wanted to allow
campaign finance reform, restrictions on commercial advertising, affirmative
action programs, and federal commandeering of state government. He argues
instead that the idea of active liberty, which animates the Constitution, helps to
justify these judgments. This is not unreasonable. But exactly what kind of
argument is it? The Framers of the Constitution also placed a high premium on
"domestic tranquility," to which the preamble explicitly refers. Would it be
right to say that because domestic tranquility is a central goal of the document,
the President is permitted to ban dangerous speech -or that because, or if,
affirmative action threatens to divide the races, in a way that compromises
"tranquility," color-blindness is the right principle after all?
In any case, Breyer rightly emphasizes that the Constitution attempts to
protect negative liberty too. Why shouldn't a ban on campaign finance
restrictions be seen to run afoul of that goal? Nor is negative liberty the only
value at stake. Such restrictions forbid people from spending their money on
political campaigns, in a way that might well be taken to compromise
participatory self-government. In this light, we could see campaign finance
restrictions as offending, at once, both negative and active liberty. Deductive
logic cannot take us from an acknowledgement of the importance of active
103. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 (1969); Cass
R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
104. See JOSEPH M. BESSETTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT (1994); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT:
FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975); JACK
N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1997); WOOD, supra note 103.
io5. See WOOD, supra note 103, at 10-45.
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liberty to an acceptance of campaign finance restrictions; there are no
syllogisms here. Instead, an evaluative judgment must be made to the effect
that, properly characterized, the First Amendment and its goal of self-
government do not condemn (the relevant) restrictions on campaign
contributions and expenditures. I believe that for many such restrictions, this
conclusion is broadly correct, especially when we consider the general need for
courts to defer to congressional judgments in hard cases.1°6 But the evaluative
judgment is inescapable.
Or suppose that we accept Breyer's claims about the centrality of active
liberty to the constitutional design. Is originalism therefore off the table?
Perhaps not. We might believe, with some constitutional theorists (including
Alexander Hamilton'0 7), that constitutional provisions, as products of an
engaged citizenry, reflect the will of "We the People" as ordinary legislation
usually does not. If so, an emphasis on the original understanding can be taken
to serve active liberty at the same time that it promotes negative liberty. It
serves active liberty because it follows the specific judgments of an engaged
citizenry. It promotes negative liberty because, and precisely to the extent that,
those judgments favor negative liberty (or for that matter active liberty). I do
not suggest that this argument is convincing. The Framers and ratifiers
included only a small segment of early America, and in any case the fact that
the Framers and ratifiers are long dead creates serious problems for those who
argue for originalism in democracy's name. The only point is that Breyer's
emphasis on active liberty does not rule originalism out of bounds.
Or return to Thayer's claim that the Court should strike down legislation
only if it clearly and unambiguously violates the Constitution. Despite his
general enthusiasm for restraint, Breyer does not mean to follow Thayer. But
why not? Thayer and his followers can claim to promote active liberty because
they allow the sovereign people to do as they choose. Indeed, Learned Hand,
an apostle of judicial restraint, wanted courts to be reluctant to invalidate
legislation in large part because he was committed to democratic self-rule."°
Perhaps Breyer thinks that this approach undervalues both negative and active
liberty, which majority rule might compromise. But is this so clear? Perhaps a
io6. An obvious qualification involves incumbent protection measures. If campaign finance
legislation is operating to insulate incumbents against electoral challenge, there is a strong
reason, on grounds of active liberty (among others), for courts to take a strong role.
107. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also i BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (arguing that constitutional decisions represent the views of
"We the People," and hence have a superior status to ordinary law).
1o8. See LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY (Irving Dilliard ed., 196o).
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deferential Court will ultimately produce exactly the right mix between the two
kinds of freedom.
Of course, Ely's approach, emphasizing reinforcement of democratic
processes, can easily be rooted in active liberty; indeed, active liberty lies at its
heart. Breyer writes approvingly of the Warren Court on the ground that its
decisions promoted active liberty,1"9 and Ely is the Warren Court's most
systematic defender. Does Breyer mean to endorse Ely? If not, where does he
differ? A puzzling gap in Breyer's book is the omission of any treatment of
Ely's apparently similar argument." °
Recall that Breyer candidly acknowledges that legislative purpose is not
something that can simply be found. Purpose is what judges attribute to the
legislature, based on their own conception of what reasonable legislators would
mean to do. If this is true for the purposes of individual statutes, it is also true
for the purposes of the Constitution. When Breyer says that a "basic" purpose
of the Constitution is to protect active liberty, so as to produce concrete
conclusions on disputed questions, his own judgments about the goals of a
reasonable constitution-maker are playing a central role. Fortunately, Breyer's
own judgments are indeed reasonable. But he underplays the extent to which
they are his own.
The same point bears on Breyer's enthusiasm for an inquiry into
consequences. Consequences certainly do matter, but much of the time it is
impossible to assess consequences without reference to disputed questions of
value. Return to the question of affirmative action, and suppose, rightly, that
the text of the Constitution could, but need not, be understood to require
color-blindness. If we care about consequences, will we accept the color-
blindness principle or not? Suppose we believe that affirmative action
programs create racial divisiveness and increase the risk that underqualified
people will be placed in important positions, to the detriment of all concerned.
If those are bad consequences, perhaps we will oppose affirmative action
programs. An emphasis on consequences as such is only a start. Of course,
Breyer is not concerned with consequences alone; he wants to understand them
with close reference to specified purposes, above all active liberty. But as I have
suggested, that idea, taken in the abstract, is compatible with a range of
different approaches to constitutional law; it need not be taken to compel
Breyer's own approach.
iog. BREYER, supra note 15, at 11.
110. There is only one reference to Ely, presaged by a "cf." See BREYER, supra note 15, at 146 n.14.
Note also that Frank Michelman has made closely related arguments. See Frank I.
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, loo HARv.
L. REv. 4 (1986).
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D. Theories and Judging
None of this means that Breyer is wrong. On the contrary, I believe that he
is generally right. He is right to reject originalism. He is right to say that the
free speech principle should be understood in democratic terms. He is right to
say that when the Court lacks important information it should rule cautiously
and narrowly. He is right to resist the constitutional assault on affirmative
action programs (an assault that, by the way, is extremely hard to defend in
originalist terms11 ). He is right to embrace a form of minimalism, counseling
narrow rulings on the hardest questions. Above all, he is right to emphasize the
importance of democratic goals to constitutional interpretation. But to make
his argument convincing, he would have to offer a more sustained encounter
between his own approach and the imaginable alternatives.
Breyer would also have to do much more to show that his own approach
imposes sufficient discipline on judicial judgments. Breyer does assert the
presence of such discipline, pointing to "the legal precedents, rules, standards,
practices, and institutional understanding that a decision will affect."".2 This is
too brisk. But it would certainly be possible for a judge concerned with active
liberty and consequences to insist on stability in the law, on small rather than
large steps, on avoiding disruption of established practices, and on a general
presumption in favor of enacted law. No general approach can eliminate
discretion from judicial decisions, but Breyer's position would be more
appealing if it were developed with careful attention to the need for constraints.
The most charitable, and in my view accurate, reading is that Breyer is
sketching an approach to legal interpretation that will, in many cases, lead him
to rule in ways that do not match his personal commitments."3
A deeper point lies in the background here. For the selection of a general
theory of interpretation, a great deal turns on context. Breyer argues against
originalism, and I agree with him; but it is possible to imagine a world in
which originalism would make a great deal of sense. Suppose, for example,
that the original public meaning of the founding document would generally or
always produce sensible results; that violations of the original public meaning
would be unjust or otherwise unacceptable; that democratic processes that did
mn. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment,
71 VA. L. REv. 753 (1985).
112. BREYER,supra note is, at 118-19.
13. Note in this regard that Justice Breyer has shown a high level of deference to the decisions of
the executive branch under President George W. Bush-higher in fact than that of many
Republican appointees; note too that in many of these cases, Justice Breyer has ruled in
favor of conservative outcomes. See Sunstein, supra note 14.
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not violate the original public meaning would not cause serious problems from
the standpoint of justice or otherwise; and that judges, not following the
original public meaning, would produce terrible blunders from the appropriate
point of view. In such a world, originalism would be the best approach to
follow. The larger point is that the Constitution itself does not contain a theory
of interpretation, and no single theory would make sense in every imaginable
world.
It is also possible to doubt whether the Supreme Court should accept any
ambitious or unitary theory of interpretation. 114 Perhaps the Court does best, in
our actual world, if it avoids ambitious accounts (including Breyer's), and
decides cases, if it can, with reference to reasons that can command agreement
from those with diverse views about foundational questions, and from those
who do not want to take a stand on those questions. Perhaps a commitment to
active liberty is too contentious or too sectarian to command general assent.
But at least this much can be said on Breyer's behalf: If an ambitious account is
desirable, indispensable, or unavoidable, an emphasis on the commitment to
democratic rule is hardly the worst place to start.
CONCLUSION
Within the Supreme Court itself, the most powerful recent theoretical
arguments have come from Justice Scalia, with his insistence on originalism
and his complaint that if courts are not bound by the original understanding
they are essentially doing whatever they want.' Breyer has now developed a
distinctive argument of his own, one that demonstrates the possibility of a
nonoriginalist method that, while not eliminating discretion, is hardly a blank
check to the judiciary. Breyer's originality lies in his effort to forge links among
its three disparate moving parts: an appreciation of active liberty and its place
in our constitutional tradition; a commitment to purposive understandings of
interpretation; and an insistence, inspired by American pragmatism, that
theories of interpretation must be evaluated in terms of their consequences.
The result is an approach that is respectful of democratic prerogatives and that
makes an important place for narrow rulings in the most difficult domains.
I have emphasized what seems to me a central problem in Breyer's account:
the difficulty of characterizing purposes, and of counting purposes as
reasonable, without an evaluative judgment of the interpreter's own. In hard
114. See CASs R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMAUSM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 1o8 HARv. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
115. See SCALIA, supra note 9, at 41-47.
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cases, judgments about purpose are partly normative, not only descriptive. 1,6
What is true for particular provisions is true for the founding document as a
whole. Active liberty is certainly a theme of the document, but it is not easy to
deduce from that theme particular conclusions about the legal issues raised by
campaign finance restrictions, affirmative action plans, privacy, and judicial
review of agency action. Nor does active liberty, standing alone, make the
choice between textual and purposive approaches to constitutional
interpretation. On purely pragmatic grounds, purposive approaches run into
serious problems once we acknowledge the role of judicial discretion in the
characterization of purposes. A commitment to active liberty is entirely
compatible with a commitment to textualism.
I have also suggested the possibility of endorsing a kind of second-order
pragmatism, one that attempts to develop tools to discipline the judicial
inquiry into both consequences and purposes. Perhaps we are all pragmatists
now, in the sense that we can agree that any theory of interpretation must pay
close attention to the outcomes that it produces." 7 Whether or not we do agree
on that point, we certainly should. The problem is that many diverse views can
march under the pragmatic banner. I have argued in particular for the
centrality of text, accompanied by canons of construction to help with the most
difficult cases.
But if Breyer's particular conclusions are not compelled by his general
themes, they are always plausible, and usually more than that; and they are
defended in a way that is appealingly generous and respectful of those who
disagree. It is highly illuminating to see, from one of the Court's "liberals," a
persistent plea for a degree of judicial modesty, a call for deference to the
judgments of the elected branches, and an endorsement of rulings that are
cautious and tentative. One of the largest virtues of his book is its convincing
demonstration that those who reject Breyer's judgments are obliged to engage
him in the terms that he has sketched-by showing how a proper respect for
self-government, and careful attention to consequences, are compatible with
competing judgments of their own.
Cass R Sunstein is Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law
School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago Law School. This
116. This point is emphasized and not deplored in DWORK1N, supra note 88. Insofar as he
emphasizes the constructive element in interpretation, Dworkin seems to me to make a large
advance on Hart and Sacks, whose approach resembles his.
117. See Scalia, supra note 9 (defending originalism in part by reference to consequentialist
considerations). Note that even Dworkin describes himself as a consequentialist. See Ronald
Dworkin, In Praise of Theory, 29 ARiz. ST. L.J. 353, 364 (1997).
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Review grows out of Cass R. Sunstein, The Philosopher-Justice, THE NEW
REPUBLIC, Sept. 19, 2oo5, at 29; the author has substantially revised and expanded
the discussion here, and the basic orientation has shifted. He is grateful to Richard
Posner and Adrian Vermeulefor extremely valuable comments on a previous draft.
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